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A RED BULL INSTEAD OF A CIGARETTE:  
SHOULD THE FDA REGULATE ENERGY 
DRINKS? 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Law is merely the expression of the will of the strongest for the 
time being, and therefore laws have no fixity, but shift from 
generation to generation. 
—Henry Brooks Adams1 
When a new American generation is born, innovation ensues; but, as 
progress advances, obstacles arise.2  How the public handles these 
setbacks differentiates the United States from other nations.3  Morals, 
values, and beliefs transform with each new generation, and the 
American legal system adapts.4 
To illustrate this principle, compare the sentiment Americans 
expressed toward tobacco usage during the World War I and World War 
II eras to the modern sentiment.5  Plainly stated, tobacco is no longer 
fashionable or sexy.6  Scientific evidence relating to the adverse health 
effects of tobacco usage and expensive anti-tobacco advertising 
campaigns largely account for the decline in tobacco use.7  Also, with the 
recent enactment of the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco 
                                                 
1 THE NEW LAWYER’S WIT AND WISDOM:  QUOTATIONS ON THE LEGAL PROFESSION, IN 
BRIEF 256 (Bruce Nash & Allan Zullo eds., 2001). 
2 See generally ERIC H. GREENBERG & KARL WEBER, GENERATION WE:  HOW MILLENNIAL 
YOUTH ARE TAKING OVER AMERICA AND CHANGING OUR WORLD FOREVER 12–14 (2008) 
(discussing how the Millennial (We) Generation—individuals born between 1978 and 
2000—is emerging as a powerful political and social force). 
3 Id. at 12.  According to Greenberg, “[g]reat leaders play an important role in shaping 
history.  But an even greater role is played by the generations of ordinary people from 
whom the great leaders arise.  Without those millions of people, sharing a common vision 
and ready to shape the future together, even great leaders can accomplish little.”  Id. 
4 Id. at 9.  Regarding the greatness of American culture, Greenberg writes, “I have faith 
that with open, informed debate, Americans can use the system we inherited from the 
Founders to make the wisest long-term choices and get our country back on the track 
toward peace, prosperity, and freedom.”  Id. 
5 See MICHAEL RABINOFF, ENDING THE TOBACCO HOLOCAUST:  HOW BIG TOBACCO 
AFFECTS OUR HEALTH, POCKETBOOK, AND POLITICAL FREEDOM—AND WHAT WE CAN DO 
ABOUT IT 74 (Barbara McNichol ed., 2006) (“Partly as a result of cigarette rationing in World 
War I and World War II, 47 percent of adult Americans were smokers by 1950.”). 
6 See id. at 97 (providing the text of a statement by former U.S. Secretary of Department 
of Health and Human Services Donna E. Shalala regarding the trendiness of cigarettes). 
7 See infra Part II.C (discussing the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control 
Act). 
Hoflander: A Red Bull Instead of a Cigarette: Should the FDA Regulate Energy
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2011
690 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45 
Control Act (“FSPTCA”), tobacco use may diminish further.8  
Consequently, the question arises, what new alluring product is seizing 
tobacco’s position?  The answer is energy drinks.9 
Consumers throughout the world purchase millions of energy drinks 
daily, and indisputably, United States citizens lead in consumption of 
those beverages.10  This result is advantageous for domestic beverage 
manufacturers, but what about those who consume the beverages?  
Results of scientific studies vary, but recent research evidences that 
energy drinks can cause adverse health effects and even death to the 
unknowing consumer.11  Some argue regulation of this industry is 
excessive, while others contend that regulation is necessary to limit 
caffeine content and inform the public of consumption risks.12  
Regardless, findings prompted several foreign nations to regulate energy 
drinks and influenced legislators in the United States to introduce bills 
with the intention of protecting the public health.13 
Currently, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) holds 
little authority to regulate energy drinks because the Federal Food, Drug, 
and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”) categorizes the beverages as dietary 
supplements.14  For instance, if the FDA attempts to compel energy drink 
manufacturers to limit caffeine content or display new warning 
statements on the packaging, the manufacturers could challenge the 
                                                 
8 See infra Part II.C (discussing the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control 
Act and its anticipated effect on the tobacco industry). 
9 This Note evaluates the similarities between the pharmacological and therapeutic 
effects of tobacco usage and energy drink consumption.  These two consumer products 
compare readily because both create adverse health effects and attract young consumers.  
Tobacco manufacturers historically marketed their products to younger demographics by 
presenting the product as trendy or chic, and energy drink manufacturers are utilizing a 
similar marketing strategy.  For many years, the populace remained unaware of the 
negative health consequences caused by tobacco, and currently, many are unaware of the 
effects of energy drink consumption.  These similarities provide helpful insight as to the 
necessity for the increased regulation of energy drinks. 
10 See infra notes 48–49 and accompanying text (specifying global and domestic sales 
figures of the rapidly expanding energy drink industry). 
11 See infra Part III.B (analyzing the efficacy of energy drink ingredients and evaluating 
the results of clashing scientific studies). 
12 See infra Part III.B (discussing the competing viewpoints as to whether regulation is 
prudent). 
13 See infra notes 102–12 and accompanying text (describing the efforts of several United 
States legislators to regulate energy drinks as well as the successful and unsuccessful 
attempts by multiple foreign nations to regulate heavily caffeinated beverages). 
14 See infra notes 54–61 and accompanying text (explaining why a manufacturer’s 
marketing claims determine whether a product, such as an energy drink, is classified as a 
dietary supplement). 
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directive and would likely succeed.15  Without a congressional 
amendment to the FDCA, the FDA’s regulatory authority regarding 
energy drinks may remain minimal.16 
First, this Note provides a history of the FDA and a discussion of its 
congressional mandate to protect the public health and safety.17  In 
addition, Part II discusses the rapidly expanding energy drink industry 
and presents a foundation for dietary supplement regulation modeled 
after provisions of the FSPTCA.18  Part III analyzes the regulation of 
energy drinks, including pharmacological elements, economic theory, 
FDA jurisdiction concerns, and discord relating to the FDA’s potential 
lack of resources.19  Part IV proposes amendments to the FDCA that will 
enable the FDA to regulate energy drinks.20  More specifically, the first 
proposed amendment provides a statutory definition of an energy drink, 
and the second proposed amendment clearly grants the FDA the 
requisite power to regulate the manufacturing, marketing, and 
distribution of energy drinks.21 
II.  BACKGROUND 
Heavily caffeinated energy drinks have addictive qualities similar to 
the nicotine found in cigarettes.22  This reality is creating speculation as 
to whether Big Energy Beverage is the new Big Tobacco and should thus 
be regulated similarly.23  Part II discusses the FDA’s mandate to regulate 
the manufacturing, marketing, and labeling of certain consumer 
products as well as a scientific and economic assessment of the rapidly 
expanding energy drink market.24  Through enabling statutes, such as 
the FDCA, Congress afforded the FDA increased authority to protect the 
                                                 
15 See infra notes 70–72 and accompanying text (discussing circumstances where the FDA 
exceeded its statutory grant of authority). 
16 See infra Part IV (proposing amendments to the FDCA that enable the FDA to regulate 
the manufacturing, marketing, and distribution of energy drinks). 
17 See infra Part II (discussing the statutory creation of the FDA and its growing 
authority). 
18 See infra Part II.B–C (discussing the global energy drink market and the FSPTCA). 
19 See infra Part III (providing a comprehensive analysis of several elements that will 
influence the FDA’s ability to regulate energy drinks). 
20 See infra Part IV (proposing statutory amendments to the FDCA). 
21 See infra Part IV (proposing statutory amendments to the FDCA). 
22 See infra Part III.B (detailing the addictive characteristics of caffeine). 
23 See infra Part II.C (providing an overview of tobacco regulation and its potential 
applicability to the energy drink industry). 
24 See infra Part II (discussing the FDA’s mandate to regulate consumer products, such as 
tobacco and dietary supplements). 
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public’s health and safety by preventing adulterated, misbranded, or 
untested consumer products from reaching the interstate market.25 
More specifically, Part II.A discusses the essential legislation and 
judicial decisions that are the pillars of the FDA’s mandate.26  Next, Part 
II.B offers an economic overview of the energy drink market and an 
explanation of why the FDA lacks the requisite power to oversee the 
energy drink industry.27  Part II.C outlines the foundation for a 
regulatory scheme applicable to energy drinks based on the framework 
of the FSPTCA with an overview of the new law’s social and economic 
impact in the United States.28  Part II.D examines the regulation of 
energy drinks in foreign countries and energy drink regulatory bills 
proposed by legislators in the United States.29  Finally, this Part examines 
numerous and lengthy acts and amendments through which Congress 
progressively broadened the FDA’s authority to regulate in order to keep 
Americans safe from dangerous products.30 
A. The FDA’s Authority to Regulate Food Products 
In 1906, Congress passed the Pure Food and Drugs Act (“Pure Food 
Act”), which was the first major piece of legislation making it unlawful 
for a person to adulterate or misbrand any drug or food.31  Section 4 of 
                                                 
25 See Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85, 121 
Stat. 823 (2007); Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act, Pub. L. No. 103-417, 108 
Stat. 4325 (1994); Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, § 101, 76 Stat. 780 (1962) 
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 351 (2006)); Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 
Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 321 (2006)); Pure 
Food and Drugs Act, Pub. L. No. 62-301, 37 Stat. 416 (1912) (amending the 1906 Act); Pure 
Food and Drugs Act, Pub. L. No. 59-384, 34 Stat. 768 (1906) (repealed by 21 U.S.C. § 329(a));  
see also United States v. Sullivan, 332 U.S. 689, 696–97 (1948) (discussing the FDA’s 
authority to prohibit misbranded articles to be transported in interstate commerce); United 
States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 278, 285 (1943) (holding that a president of a 
corporation may be found guilty for violating the FDCA, independent of the corporation’s 
guilt). 
26 See infra Part II.A (discussing the creation of the FDA through enabling legislation and 
its purpose presented through legislative history). 
27 See infra Part II.B (providing an industry analysis and description of the FDA’s power 
to regulate dietary supplements and health products). 
28 See infra Part II.C (discussing the scope of the Family Smoking Prevention and 
Tobacco Control Act and examining the financial and social effects of the Act regarding 
private industries and the American populace). 
29 See infra Part II.D (providing a description of the regulation of energy drinks in foreign 
countries and the movement in America by legislators and academics to regulate the 
energy drink industry). 
30 See infra Part II.A (discussing the creation of the FDA and expansion of regulatory 
authority enabled by multiple statutes passed by Congress). 
31 See Pure Food and Drugs Act, Pub. L. No. 59-384, 34 Stat. 768 (1906) (repealed by 21 
U.S.C. § 329(a)) (ensuring that products are labeled correctly and paving the way for the 
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the Pure Food Act authorized the Bureau of Chemistry to perform 
examinations of the allegedly substandard food or drug article.32  If the 
food or drug article was deemed misbranded or adulterated, the Bureau 
would first inform the responsible party.  After the party had an 
opportunity to be heard and if a violation still existed, the Bureau would 
notify the proper United States District Attorney of the violation.33  The 
Pure Food Act provided for removal of the misbranded or adulterated 
article but failed to include a provision regulating false claims of 
effectiveness.34  Although the Pure Food Act was amended in 1912 to 
remedy this particular omission of misbranding regulation, a new act 
was passed two decades later, fashioning a new agency armed with a 
congressional mandate to regulate.35 
Congress officially created the FDA in 1938 by passing the FDCA.36  
The chief purpose of the FDCA is to forbid “the movement in interstate 
                                                                                                             
formation of the FDA).  Congress enacted the Pure Food Act in 1906 “in response to 
criticism by the Progressive movement of widespread food and drug impurities [to] 
establish[] liability for the manufacture of adulterated or misbranded drugs.”  Steven R. 
Salbu, Regulation of Drug Treatments for HIV and AIDS:  A Contractarian Model of Access, 11 
YALE J. ON REG. 401, 406 (1994) (footnotes omitted) (detailing the history of the FDA 
approval process). 
32 Pure Food and Drugs Act § 4.  See Salbu, supra note 31, at 407 (discussing the creation 
of the Pure Food and Drugs Act). 
33 Pure Food and Drugs Act § 4.  See Salbu, supra note 31, at 406–07 (providing a brief 
background regarding the Pure Food Act and discussing the primary purpose of why 
Congress passed the Pure Food Act.).  The Pure Food Act held manufacturers responsible 
for the safety (or lack thereof) of their products and it loosely required them to monitor 
their products for errors in “strength, quality, and purity,” and to accurately label the 
products.  Id. at 407. 
34 See generally Deborah F. Buckman, Annotation, Remedies Available for Violations of 
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), 25 A.L.R. FED. 2D 431 (2008) (providing a 
general overview of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act).  In 1911, in United States v. 
Johnson, 221 U.S. 488, 498 (1911), the Supreme Court held that although the Pure Food Act 
prohibited mislabeling of drug ingredients, it did not forbid other kinds of fraudulent 
claims made on product labels.  “Moreover, the 1906 Act failed to enumerate standards or 
specific methods of pre-market testing that would prevent adulteration, or to provide any 
mechanism for centralized regulatory approval of new drugs.”  Salbu, supra note 31, at 407 
(discussing the primary purposes of why Congress passed the Pure Food Act). 
35 Sherley Amendment of 1912, Pub. L. No. 62-352, 37 Stat. 416, 416 (1912).  The Pure 
Food Act of 1912 amended Section 8 of the Pure Food Act of 1906 by adding a third 
paragraph, which states:  “[i]f its package or label shall bear or contain any statement, 
design, or device regarding the curative or therapeutic effect of such article or any of the 
ingredients or substances contained therein, which is false and fraudulent.”  Id.  Congress 
passed the Pure Food Act of 1912 following United States v. Johnson, where the Supreme 
Court held that the statute does not cover misleading statements on labels.  Johnson, 221 
U.S. at 498–99. 
36 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) 
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 321 (2006)).  The FDCA required that drug 
manufacturers provide proof that their products were safe before they could be marketed 
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commerce of adulterated and misbranded food, drugs, devices, and 
cosmetics.”37  Prior to 1938, the federal government did not require 
manufacturers to perform pre-market reviews of their products before 
selling them to the public.38  In 1962, however, Congress amended the 
FDCA following a thalidomide drug tragedy that generated thousands 
of birth defects.39  These amendments require the FDA to ensure that 
manufacturers of drugs demonstrate that their products are effective and 
safe through “substantial evidence.”40  In addition, the amendments 
require the manufacturer to properly label their products and prohibit 
the manufacturer from misleading consumers through false statements 
contrary to test results.41 
In the 1970s, the failure of medical devices and thousands of tort 
claims prompted Congress to pass the Medical Device Amendments of 
1976 (“MDA”), which imposed heightened government oversight.42  The 
                                                                                                             
to the public.  See Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. 
Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695, 705–06 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (discussing the conception of the FDA).  
In his Yale law journal article, Steven Salbu describes drug tragedies and congressional 
reaction to those tragedies.  Salbu, supra note 31, at 407.  For instance, 
[i]n 1937, the shortcomings of the 1906 Act were demonstrated by the 
tragedy brought on by the use of Elixir Sulfanilamide, marketed by the 
drug manufacturer Massengill.  While the “elixir” was merely a liquid 
version of a drug already available in pill form, the solvent used in the 
solution had not been tested for safety.  Its toxicity resulted in 107 
deaths.  Under the 1906 Act, Massengill was fined $26,100 for product 
mislabeling. 
Id.  Most importantly, the FDCA required prospective manufacturers to file applications for 
the sale of new drugs with the Secretary of Agriculture, “describing drug components and 
composition, methods of production control, and proposed labeling language.”  Id. at 408. 
37 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) 
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 321 (2006)); see also supra note 36 (providing a 
background of the FDCA). 
38 See Buckman, supra note 34 (providing a historical analysis of the FDCA). 
39 Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, § 101, 76 Stat. 780, 780–96 (1962) 
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 351 (2006)).  Similar to how the Elixir Sulfanilamide 
disaster inspired the 1938 Act, the Kefauver-Harris Amendments (“1962 Amendments”) 
resulted from a thalidomide tragedy.  Salbu, supra note 31, at 408.  German pharmaceutical 
manufacturer, Grünenthal, marketed Thalidomide as a sedative for pregnant women.  Id. at 
408, n.41.  Consumption of the drug caused birth defects in thousands of infants.  Id.  “The 
1962 Amendments required more rigorous pre-approval drug testing than was required 
under the 1938 Act, instituting a series of clinical testing ‘phases’ that comprise the norm 
under current law.”  Id. at 408. 
40 Drug Amendments of 1962 § 101. 
41 Id. 
42 Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539 (1976); Riegel v. 
Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 315–16 (2008) (describing reasons for enactment of the MDA).  
Congress enacted the MDA “[t]o amend the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to 
provide for the safety and effectiveness of medical devices intended for human use, and for 
other purposes.”  Medical Device Amendments of 1976, 90 Stat. at 539.  “A series of high-
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FDA’s regulatory strength continued to grow subsequent to the 
enactment of the Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act of 1994 
(“DSHEA”), enforced by the Center for Food Safety and Applied 
Nutrition (“CFSAN”).43  Once more, Congress amended the FDCA by 
passing the Food and Drug Administration Amendments of 2007, and in 
doing so, permitted the FDA the authority to require manufacturers of 
previously approved products to adhere to modern FDCA regulation.44  
                                                                                                             
profile medical device failures that caused extensive injuries and loss of life propelled 
adoption of the MDA.”  Riegel, 552 U.S. at 336 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  The most 
conspicuous failure was the Dalkon Shield intrauterine device used by approximately 2.2 
million women in the United States between 1970 and 1974.  Id.; In re N. Dist. of Cal., 
Dalkon Shield IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 693 F.2d 847, 848 (9th Cir. 1982).  The Dalkon Shield 
was aggressively promoted as a safe and effective form of birth control and was linked to 
sixteen deaths and twenty-five miscarriages by mid-1975.  H.R. REP. NO. 94-853, at 8 (1976).  
By early 1976, “more than 500 lawsuits seeking compensatory and punitive damages 
totaling more than $400 million” were filed.  Riegel, 552 U.S. at 336.  In Riegel, Justice 
Ginsburg stated, “[g]iven the publicity attending the Dalkon Shield litigation and 
Congress’ awareness of the suits at the time the MDA was under consideration, I find 
informative the absence of any sign of a legislative design to preempt state common-law 
tort actions.”  Id. at 336–37. 
43 Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act, Pub. L. No. 103-417, 108 Stat. 4325 
(1994); see infra note 57 (providing the statutory requirements for a product to be classified 
as a dietary supplement).  The DSHEA was designed to afford the FDA procedural 
provisions applicable only to dietary supplements.  Peter Barton Hutt, FDA Statutory 
Authority to Regulate the Safety of Dietary Supplements, 31 AM. J.L. & MED. 155, 156 (2005) 
[hereinafter Hutt, FDA Statutory Authority to Regulate the Safety of Dietary Supplements].  The 
procedural provisions include the following: 
[f]irst, DSHEA specifically places the burden of proof in a civil 
enforcement action relating to the safety of a dietary supplement on 
[the] FDA. . . . Second, the court must decide the issue of adulteration 
of a dietary supplement on a de novo basis. . . . Third, [the] FDA must 
provide a person an opportunity to present both oral and written 
views at least ten days before the agency refers a matter to the 
Department of Justice for civil court enforcement. 
Id.  See About the Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/ 
AboutFDA/CentersOffices/CFSAN/default.htm (last visited Sept. 12, 2010) (providing 
general information about the CFSAN); CFSAN—What We Do, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/ 
AboutFDA/CentersOffices/CFSAN/WhatWeDo/default.htm (last visited Sept 12, 2010) 
(detailing the CFSAN’s statutory obligations); FOOD & DRUG ADMINISTRATION, DETAIL OF 
FULL-TIME EQUIVALENT (FTE) EMPLOYMENT PROGRAM LEVEL, available at http://www. 
fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/ReportsManualsForms/Reports/BudgetReports/UCM15
3892.pdf (last visited Oct. 6, 2010) (providing a detailed report of FDA employment 
figures); FOOD & DRUG ADMINISTRATION, FY 2010 ALL PURPOSE TABLE—BUDGET 
AUTHORITY, available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/ReportsManuals 
Forms/Reports/BudgetReports/UCM153876.pdf (last visited Oct. 6, 2010) (providing an 
itemized FDA budget allocation for 2010). 
44 See Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85, 121 
Stat. 823 (2007) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 301 (2006)).  Congress amended the 
FDCA “to revise and extend the user-fee programs for prescription drugs and for medical 
devices, to enhance the postmarket authorities of the Food and Drug Administration with 
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As a result of these acts and amendments, the FDA has the cumbersome 
task of ensuring that food, drug, and cosmetic products are of high 
integrity so that consumers can trust the products are safe without 
question.45 
B. The Rapidly Expanding Energy Drink Industry & the FDA’s Lack of 
Regulatory Authority 
Energy drinks commonly include additives, such as caffeine, 
guarana, taurine, ginseng, ginkgo, and glucuronolactone that are 
intended to improve cognitive abilities, mental focus, and muscle 
endurance.46  The market for energy drinks in the United States began in 
                                                                                                             
respect to the safety of drugs.”  Id.  Congress amended the FDCA consequent to “[a] report 
from the Institute of Medicine suggest[ing] the FDA has not effectively monitored the 
safety of pharmaceuticals subsequent to initial approval for use and recommend[ing] 
changes to the process by which the FDA monitors postmarketing-adverse-event-
surveillance.”  Leslie Kushner, Note, Incentivizing Postmarketing Pharmaceutical Product 
Safety Testing with Extension of Exclusivity Periods, 19 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. 
L.J. 519, 520 (2009).  See generally INST. OF MED., THE FUTURE OF DRUG SAFETY: PROMOTING 
AND PROTECTING THE HEALTH OF THE PUBLIC (Alina Baciu, Kathleen Stratton & Sheila P. 
Burke eds., 2007). 
45 See supra note 36 (explaining the history of the FDCA); see also Peter Barton Hutt, 
Recent Developments:  The State of Science at the Food and Drug Administration, 60 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 431, 434–36 (2008) [hereinafter Hutt, The State of Science] (providing a history of the 
FDA and the products it regulates); FDA, FISCAL YEAR 2010 CONGRESSIONAL JUSTIFICATION, 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:  INTRODUCTION AND MISSION, available at http://www.fda.gov/ 
downloads/AboutFDA/ReportsManualsForms/Reports/BudgetReports/UCM153491.pdf 
(last visited Sept. 12, 2010) (“FDA affects the lives of every American every day.  Each year, 
consumers spend nearly $1.5 trillion on FDA-regulated products.  This represents twenty 
percent of all consumer expenditures.”). 
46 See generally Michele Simon & James Mosher, Alcohol, Energy Drinks, and Youth: A 
Dangerous Mix, MARIN INST., 2007, available at http://www.marininstitute.org/alcopops/ 
resources/EnergyDrinkReport.pdf (last visited Sept. 12, 2010) [hereinafter Simon & 
Mosher] (discussing the purpose of an energy drink).  Energy drink companies, such as the 
industry-leading Red Bull, attribute their product’s stimulant effect to the interaction of 
such ingredients.  Id. at 9.  On its website, Red Bull describes its product as a “functional 
beverage with a unique combination of ingredients . . . specially developed for times of 
increased mental and physical exertion.”  Red Bull Energy Drink, RED BULL USA, 
http://www.redbullusa.com/cs/Satellite/en_US/Red-Bull-Home/Products/01124274620 
8542 (last visited Sept. 25, 2010).  Additionally, Red Bull states that its formula “increases 
performance[,] increases concentration and reaction speed[,] improves vigilance[,] 
improves the emotional status[, and] stimulates metabolism.”  Id.  “The term energy drink 
refers to a beverage that contains caffeine in combination with other ingredients such as 
taurine, guarana, and B vitamins, and that claims to provide its consumers with extra 
energy.  This term was created by [beverage] companies . . . and is not recognized by the 
[FDA] or the [USDA].”  Karrie Heneman & Sheri Zidenberg-Cherr, Nutrition and Health Info 
Sheet:  Energy Drinks, ANR COMMC’N. SERVS., PUBL’N 8265 (2007), available at 
http://ucanr.org/freepubs/docs/8265.pdf (last visited Sept. 12, 2010).  Energy drink 
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1997 with the introduction of the Austrian-produced Red Bull.47  From 
2002 to 2007, the energy drink market grew by an estimated 440% and 
                                                                                                             
companies commonly make the following effective functional claims regarding the 
ingredients of their products: 
[C]arnitine:  improves endurance, increases fat metabolism; protects 
against cardiovascular disease[;] 
[G]lucuronlactone:  promotes excretion of toxins and protects against 
cancer[;] 
[G]uarana:  increases energy, enhances physical performance and 
promotes weight loss[;] 
[I]nositol:  decreases triglyceride and cholesterol levels, lowering risk 
of cardiovascular disease[;] 
[P]anax [G]inseng:  speeds illness recovery; improves mental, physical 
and sexual performance; controls blood glucose and lowers blood 
pressure[;] 
[S]uper [C]itramax:  suppresses appetite, resulting in weight loss[;] 
[T]aurine:  lowers risk of diabetes, epilepsy, and high blood pressure[; 
and] 
[Y]ohimbine HCl:  improves sexual performance and promotes weight 
loss. 
Id. at 2. (footnotes omitted) (formatting omitted).  Because energy drinks are quite new in 
America, there is limited scientific evidence regarding the interaction of ingredients; 
however, evidence of efficacy of individual ingredients are as follows: 
[C]arnitine:  [t]here is no clinical evidence that carnitine use is effective 
for increased endurance or weight loss, but it may protect against heart 
disease. 
[G]lucuronlactone:  [s]cientific evidence does not exist to support 
claims regarding the efficacy of glucuronolactone. 
[G]uarana:  [a] major component of guarana is caffeine.  Caffeine 
consumption has been associated with increased energy, enhancement 
of physical performance, and suppressed appetite. 
[I]nositol:  [s]cientific evidence does not exist to support claims 
regarding the efficacy of inositol. 
[P]anax [G]inseng:  [s]cientific evidence does not exist to support 
claims regarding the efficacy of panax ginseng. 
[S]uper [C]itramax:  [t]here is scientific evidence that use of this 
supplement decreases food consumption. 
[T]aurine:  [c]linical evidence is insufficient to show that taurine is 
effective in treating diabetes or epilepsy, but it may lower blood 
pressure. 
[Y]ohimbine HCl:  [a]lthough yohimbine HCl may increase blood flow 
to sexual organs, there is no evidence that it increases sexual arousal.  
It may be effective at treating erectile dysfunction. Currently no 
evidence exists to support the claim that use of this supplement leads 
to weight loss. 
Id. (footnotes omitted) (formatting omitted).  See Caffeine Myths and Facts, WEBMD, 
http://www.webmd.com/balance/caffeine-myths-and-facts?page=3 (last visited Sept. 12, 
2010) (describing positive and negative effects of energy drink consumption). 
47 Simon & Mosher, supra note 46, at 3.  Energy drink sales have exploded since the 
introduction of Red Bull in 1997.  Id.  The Center for Science in the Public Interest compiled 
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included more than 500 energy drink companies worldwide.48  As a 
result of this extremely rapid expansion, annual energy drink sales in the 
United States alone totaled a lofty $6.6 billion.49  Additionally, analysts 
predict U.S. energy drink sales to top $9 billion by 2011.50  This 
accomplishment is likely the result of non-paternalistic regulation, 
aggressive advertising, and the promotion of energy drinks as 
performance enhancers to a target market of young adults.51  In order to 
                                                                                                             
caffeine content (mg) of food and drug products on its website, and caffeine content of top-
selling energy drinks are as follows: 
Spike Shooter 8.4 oz., 300; Cocaine 8.4 oz., 288; Monster Energy 16 oz., 
160; Full Throttle 16 oz., 144; Rip It, all varieties 8 oz., 100; Enviga 12 
oz., 100; Tab Energy 10.5 oz., 95; SoBe No Fear 8 oz., 83; Red Bull 8.3 
oz., 80; Red Bull Sugarfree 8.3 oz., 80; Rockstar Energy Drink 8 oz., 80; 
SoBe Adrenaline Rush 8.3 oz., 79; Amp 8.4 oz., 74; Glaceau Vitamin 
Water Energy Citrus 20 oz., 50; SoBe Essential Energy, Berry or Orange 
8 oz., 48. 
Caffeine Content of Food & Drugs, CTR. FOR SCI. IN THE PUB. INTEREST, Sept. 2007, available at 
http://www.cspinet.org/new/cafchart.htm (last visited Sept. 12, 2010) (formatting 
omitted). 
48 JORGE S. OLSON & CARLOS LOPEZ, BUILD YOUR BEVERAGE EMPIRE 27 (Gloria L. Olson 
ed., 2009). 
49 Id.; see Kevin Mayhood, Jolted by Studies, Researchers Want Caffeine Labels on Energy 
Drinks, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Sept. 24, 2008, http://www.dispatch.com/live/content/ 
local_news/stories/2008/09/24/drink_label.ART_ART_09-24-08_A1_UHBDNBA.html 
(reporting why researchers want energy drink regulation); Simon & Mosher, supra note 46, 
at 3 (providing a synopsis of the energy drink market share); Elizabeth Weise, Petition Calls 
for FDA to Regulate Energy Drinks: Critics Want Caffeine Levels Listed, Limited, USA TODAY, 
Oct. 22, 2008, at 6D (describing energy drink sales figures).  Since 2006, BevNet has 
published an annual comprehensive compilation of energy drink brands and market 
analysis of the previous year.  BEVNET Energy Drink Buyer’s Guide 2007, BEVERAGE 
SPECTRUM, available at http://www.bevnet.com/news/2007/04-10-2007-energy_drink_ 
guide_free.asp.  The market share of the top five energy drinks in 2007 are as follows:  Red 
Bull, 42.6%; Monster, 14.4%; Rockstar, 11.4%; Full Throttle, 6.9%; Sobe No Fear, 5.4%.  Id.  
The market share of the top five energy drinks in 2008 are as follows:  Red Bull, 35.2%; 
Monster, 27.3%; Rockstar, 11.1%; Full Throttle, 6.6%; Amp, 5.1%.  2008 Energy Drink Guide, 
BEVERAGE SPECTRUM, available at http://www.bevnet.com/news/2008/4-14-2008-EDG.asp.  
The market share of the top five energy drinks (currently in 2009) are as follows:  Red Bull, 
40.1%; Monster, 16.2%; Rockstar, 11.0%; Amp, 4.0%; Monster Java, 2.6%.  2009 Energy Drink 
Guide, BEVERAGE SPECTRUM, available at http://www.bevnet.com/news/2009/4-13-2009-
free-energy-drink-guide.  The 2009 analysis separates market share percentage by each 
individual variety and flavor of energy drink, not just the brand name as the 2006 and 2007 
analyses provide. 
50 OLSON & LOPEZ, supra note 48, at 27. 
51 See Weise, supra note 49, at 6D (“The drinks are advertised as able to increase 
endurance, reaction time and concentration, with names such as Full Throttle, Amp Energy 
and No Fear.”).  But cf. TEVFIK F. NAS, COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS:  THEORY AND APPLICATION 
1–2 (Diane S. Foster ed., 1996) (discussing cost-benefit analyses consumers perform every 
day); THE POLITICS OF REGULATION:  INSTITUTIONS AND REGULATORY REFORMS FOR THE AGE 
OF GOVERNANCE 36 (Jacint Jordana & David Levi-Faur eds., 2004) (inferring that consumers 
are competent in their assessment of a product and whether to purchase it); STEVEN D. 
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reach this target audience, energy drink companies commonly market 
their products at the grassroots level to form one-on-one relationships 
with the consumer.52  Energy drink companies market and sell these 
drinks as dietary supplements, not as soft drinks such as Coca-Cola or 
Pepsi.53 
                                                                                                             
SODERLIND, CONSUMER ECONOMICS:  A PRACTICAL OVERVIEW 245 (2001) (providing an 
economic and marketing perspective to government regulation); Gerald Dworkin, 
Paternalism, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2006), 
available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/paternalism/ (last visited Sept. 12, 2010) 
(defining paternalistic regulation); Edward L. Glaeser, Homo Economicus, Homo Myopicus, 
and the Law and Economics of Consumer Choice:  Paternalism and Psychology, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 
133, 133 (2006) (providing an overview of regulation theory); Christine Jolls & Cass R. 
Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 199, 200–01 (2006) (discussing the 
varying degrees of paternalistic regulation); Michael A. McCann, Economic Efficiency and 
Consumer Choice Theory in Nutritional Labeling, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 1161, 1175–78 (2004) 
(explaining the consumer choice theory in terms of food purchases); Mario J. Rizzo & 
Douglas Glen Whitman, Little Brother is Watching You:  New Paternalism on the Slippery 
Slopes, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 685, 689–91 (2009) (presenting policy arguments regarding why 
consumers are affected by government regulation); Theory of Consumer Choice, BASIC 
ECONOMICS, http://www.basiceconomics.info/theory-of-consumer-choice.php (last visited 
Sept, 12, 2010) (explaining that consumers combine budget constraints and preferences 
when choosing certain products). 
52 See Simon & Mosher, supra note 46, at 4 (describing energy drink advertising and 
marketing strategies); Weise, supra note 49 (providing examples of advertising claims).  
These relationships are “gained through events, extreme sports sponsorships, [and] 
Internet interactions . . . .  For example, the Monster brand’s ‘ambassadors’ give away free 
samples at sporting events, concerts, and other teen venues.  Red Bull owns teams such as 
the New York Red Bulls soccer team and plans to start its own NASCAR team.”  Simon & 
Mosher, supra note 46, at 4.  Other energy drink manufacturers, such as Full Throttle, Amp 
Energy, and Cocaine target their products to young males and “promote the psychoactive, 
performance-enhancing, and stimulant effects of energy drinks and appear to glorify drug 
use.”  Chad J. Reissig et al., Caffeinated Energy Drinks—A Growing Problem, DRUG ALCOHOL 
DEPENDENCE (2008), available at http://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/bin/w/y/Griffiths.pdf.  
Even more extreme is the energy drink “Blow,” which is “packaged in glass vials and 
shipped with a mirror and plastic credit cards in an apparent attempt to model cocaine 
use.”  Id.  “Recently, the FDA claimed jurisdiction over both ‘Cocaine’ and ‘Blow,’ 
informing the companies that their products were marketed as an alternative to an illicit 
street drug, not a dietary supplement, and subject to regulation as a drug.”  Id. (citations 
omitted). 
53 Kelly Brewington, High-Energy Drink Jitters: Hopkins Researchers Report on Possible 
Caffeine Risks, BALT. SUN, Sept. 24, 2008, at 1A.  According to Senior Staff Attorney Ilene 
Heller, “[i]f a caffeinated energy drink is marketed as [conventional] food, it would come 
under food additive regulations and thus have to adhere to FDA’s caffeine limit in soda.”  
Study Urges FDA to Step Up Oversight of Caffeine in Supplements, 14 FDA WEEK 39, 39 (Sept. 
26, 2008) (providing proponents’ argument for FDA energy drink regulation).  The FDA 
has set a caffeine content limit on soft drinks at sixty-eight milligrams for twelve fluid 
ounces.  See Michele Morgan Bolton, Some Schools Put the Lid on High-Caffeine Beverages:  Say 
Energy Drinks Pose Health Risk Packed With Caffeine, BOS. GLOBE, July 25, 2009, at 1 
(providing data regarding caffeine content of soft drinks and energy drinks). 
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Current governing statutes afford the FDA little authority to regulate 
energy drinks because the FDCA treats energy drinks as dietary 
supplements.54  The FDA classifies food products as either dietary 
supplements or conventional foods based on the manufacturer’s 
representations and marketing claims.55  Strangely, however, food 
products are classified not by their ingredients, composition, safety, or 
nutritional value, but rather by the producer’s marketing claims.56  The 
Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act thus effectively 
constrains the FDA’s power to regulate by creating a subcategory of 
food—dietary supplements.57  If a manufacturer markets its product as a 
dietary supplement, the DSHEA requires that the product’s label 
conspicuously state that it is a dietary supplement and not a 
conventional food.58  However, an effect of this congressionally created 
subcategory is that a food product can concurrently be classified as both 
                                                 
54 See Michael McCarthy, Energy Drink Abuse Worries Health Pros:  Big Quantities Might 
Result in Problems, USA TODAY, July 2, 2009, at 6C (discussing the FDA’s lack of power to 
regulate dietary supplements like energy drinks).  FDA spokeswoman Susan Cruzan 
stated, “[w]e have no guidance or regulations that govern the formulation of energy 
drinks . . . .  Under current law, the manufacturer is responsible for ensuring that its 
products are safe and such products do not require FDA premarket review or approval.”  
Id. 
55 See 21 U.S.C. § 321(ff) (2006) (providing the statutory definition of a dietary 
supplement); Hutt, FDA Statutory Authority to Regulate the Safety of Dietary Supplements, 
supra note 43, at 166 (stating procedural provisions of the DSHEA). 
56 See Hutt, FDA Statutory Authority to Regulate the Safety of Dietary Supplements, supra 
note 43, at 166 (discussing why a food product may be considered a dietary supplement); 
Suzan Onel, Dietary Supplements:  A Definition That is Black, White, and Gray, 31 AM. J.L. & 
MED. 341, 348 (2005) (claiming that the DSHEA is a lenient and ambiguous statute). 
57 See Barbara A. Noah, Foreword:  Dietary Supplement Regulation in Flux, 31 AM. J.L. & 
MED. 147, 148 (2005) (explaining Congress’s intention in drafting the DSHEA).  21 U.S.C. 
§ 201(ff)(1) of the FDCA, as augmented by DSHEA, defines a “dietary supplement” as 
a product (other than tobacco) intended to supplement the diet that 
bears or contains one or more of the following dietary ingredients: 
 (A) a vitamin; 
 (B) a mineral; 
 (C) an herb or other botanical; 
 (D) an amino acid; 
 (E) a dietary substance for use by man to supplement the diet by 
increasing the total dietary intake; or 
 (F) a concentrate, metabolite, constituent, extract, or combination 
of any ingredient described in clause (A), (B), (C), (D), or (E). 
21 U.S.C. § 201(ff)(1) (2006).  See Hutt, FDA Statutory Authority to Regulate the Safety of 
Dietary Supplements, supra note 43, at 159 (discussing the statutory overlap regarding the 
definition of dietary supplements and conventional foods). 
58 See Hutt, FDA Statutory Authority to Regulate the Safety of Dietary Supplements, supra 
note 43, at 166 (discussing labeling requirements for dietary supplements and conventional 
foods). 
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a conventional food and as a dietary supplement.59  Likewise, two 
products containing the exact same vitamins and minerals can be 
classified as either a dietary supplement or conventional food product 
depending on marketing claims.60  Simply changing the label can remove 
a product from one category and place it in the other.61  Although it may 
appear that the FDA’s regulatory authority of dietary supplements is 
lacking, the FDA nonetheless mandates producers of dietary 
supplements to abide by the labeling guidelines promulgated by 21 
C.F.R. § 101.36.62 
The DSHEA permits dietary supplement manufacturers to market 
their products without receiving any pre-market authorization from the 
FDA.63  Thus, as long as a manufacturer marketed its “new dietary 
ingredient” (“NDI”) before October 15, 1994, it could sell its dietary 
supplement without FDA approval.64  The DSHEA assumes that 
individual components of a whole food product cannot cause harm, even 
when ingested in large quantities.65  Ultimately, however, the 
manufacturer’s “product definition, product safety, nutritional support 
claims, and labeling” determine the extent of the FDA’s regulatory 
power.66  Although the FDA’s authority to regulate dietary supplements 
and conventional foods is relatively weak, the FDA possesses 
considerably broader authority to control the tobacco industry.67 
                                                 
59 Id. at 159. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 21 C.F.R. § 101.36 (2006); Hutt, FDA Statutory Authority to Regulate the Safety of Dietary 
Supplements, supra note 43, at 166.  “A product that is explicitly labeled as a dietary 
supplement must bear the ‘Supplement Facts’ box on the label, in accordance with FDA 
regulations promulgated under the authority of DSHEA.”  Id. at 166.  However, “[a] food 
that is not explicitly labeled as a dietary supplement on the principal display panel of the 
label must instead bear the ‘Nutrition Facts’ box in accordance with regulations 
promulgated by FDA under the authority of the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 
1990.”  Id. (footnotes omitted). 
63 See Noah, supra note 57, at 149 (defining “dietary supplement” as stated in the 
DSHEA). 
64 Id.  However, if the manufacturer marketed the NDI after October 15, 1994, the 
company must file a notification with the FDA at least seventy-five days prior to market 
introduction, which provides the basis for the manufacturer’s conclusion that the 
supplement is reasonably safe and must demonstrate only that there is a history of use or 
other evidence of safety.  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  See 21 U.S.C. § 350b(a)(2) 
(2006) (providing safety guidelines for dietary supplements). 
65 Peter J. Cohen, Science, Politics, and the Regulation of Dietary Supplements:  It’s Time to 
Repeal DSHEA, 31 AM. J.L. & MED. 175, 176 (2005). 
66 Jennifer Kay Braman, Note, Food for Sport or Faustian Bargain: Regulating Performance 
Enhancing Dietary Supplements, 47 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 417, 431 (1999). 
67 See infra Part II.C (discussing the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control 
Act of 2009); see also Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 
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C. The Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of 2009 
Amidst the fervor of President Obama’s election, Congress passed a 
law granting the FDA extensive authority to regulate a sector not far 
removed from the energy drink business—the tobacco industry.68  On 
June 22, 2009, President Obama signed into law the Family Smoking 
Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (“FSPTCA”), which now grants the 
FDA the broad power to regulate the manufacturing, marketing, and 
distribution of tobacco products.69 
Some academics contend that in the last forty years, the FDA was 
creative in interpreting its own statutory authority.70  In the early 1970s, 
top FDA officials offered the opinion that the FDCA represents a “broad 
‘constitution’ authorizing the FDA to protect the public health by any 
                                                                                                             
(1984) (providing a two-part test to determine whether an agency properly interpreted its 
enabling statute); Nathan Alexander Sales & Jonathan H. Adler, The Rest is Silence:  
Chevron Deference, Agency Jurisdiction, and Statutory Silences, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1497, 1513–
15 (2009) (providing case law that challenged the FDA’s scope of authority under the 
FDCA); Craig A. Conway, FDA Gains Regulatory Authority over Tobacco, HEALTH LAW 
PERSPECTIVES, July 2009, available at http://www.law.uh.edu/healthlaw/perspectives/ 
2009/(CC)%20Tobacco.pdf (discussing the FSPTCA and the FDA’s expanded authority to 
regulate tobacco). 
68 See infra note 74 and accompanying text (providing the purpose of the Family 
Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act). 
69 Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, 123 Stat. 
1776 (2009) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (2006 & Supp. 2009)).  Congress 
passed the FSPTCA “[t]o protect the public health by providing the Food and Drug 
Administration with certain authority to regulate tobacco products.”  Id.; see also Hunter v. 
Philip Morris USA, 582 F.3d 1039, 1046–48 (9th Cir. 2009) (discussing whether state law 
claims are preempted by congressional policy). 
70 See Lars Noah & Barbara A. Noah, Nicotine Withdrawal:  Assessing the FDA’s Effort to 
Regulate Tobacco Products, 48 ALA. L. REV. 1, 7 (1996) (alleging that the FDA may be 
interpreting its statutory authority to regulate tobacco too broadly); see also, e.g., FDA v. 
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 126 (2000) (deciding whether Congress 
intended for the FDA to regulate tobacco under the FDCA); 62 Cases of Jam v. United 
States, 340 U.S. 593, 600 (1951) (“In our anxiety to effectuate the congressional purpose of 
protecting the public, we must take care not to extend the scope of the statute beyond the 
point where Congress indicated it would stop.”); Se. Minerals, Inc. v. Harris, 622 F.2d 758, 
767 (5th Cir. 1980) (criticizing the FDA’s “bureaucratic hubris that confuses abuse of power 
with reason”); United States v. Parkinson, 240 F.2d 918, 921 (9th Cir. 1956) (“The record of 
the past few decades is replete with examples of the tendency of executive agencies to 
expand their field of operations. A passion and a zeal to crusade affects their operations.”); 
H. Thomas Austern, Philosophy of Regulation:  A Reply to Mr. Hutt, 28 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 
189, 191 (1973) (criticizing the suggestion that “a well-motivated administrative agency can 
legally do what it alone deems desirable unless Congress has in advance specifically 
prohibited it”); James D. Poliquin, Comment, The Incremental Development of an Extra-
Statutory System of Regulation:  A Critique of Food and Drug Administration Regulation of Added 
Poisonous and Deleterious Substances, 33 ME. L. REV. 103, 103 (1981) (“[T]he agency has 
chosen to take advantage of the statute’s ambiguity to enhance its regulatory powers, often 
assigning strained interpretations of the statute to advance the agency’s perceived goals.”). 
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necessary and proper means, rather than a limited and precise 
delegation of Congress’ legislative power.”71  In many cases, courts give 
deference to the FDA’s statutory authority and do not challenge its 
interpretation of regulations; however, the same cannot be said for 
tobacco regulation.72 
Preceding ratification of the FSPTCA, the majority of legislative 
proposals to control the tobacco industry were in the form of tax 
increases, advertising bans, or warning labels.73  The FSPTCA heightened 
the FDA’s ability to regulate the tobacco industry in that it could now 
control the manufacturing, marketing, and distribution of tobacco 
products.74  On March 3, 2009, Representative Henry Waxman of 
                                                 
71 Noah & Noah, supra note 70, at 7–8; see Peter Barton Hutt, Philosophy of Regulation 
Under the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 28 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 177, 178 (1973) 
[hereinafter Hutt, Philosophy of Regulation] (Hutt writes, “the Act must be regarded as a 
constitution. . . . The mission of the [FDA] is to implement [its fundamental] objectives 
through the most effective and efficient controls that can be devised”).  See also United 
States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 280 (1943) (suggesting that the FDCA is “a working 
instrument of government and not merely as a collection of English words”). 
72 See generally Hutt, Philosophy of Regulation, supra note 71, at 178–79.  See, e.g., Miss. 
Power & Light Co. v. Miss. ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 386 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
(“Our agency deference cases have always been limited to statutes the agency was 
‘entrusted to administer.’”) (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844). 
73 See Shaukat Karjeker, Federal Preemption of Cigarette Products Liability Claims Creates a 
Need for Congressional Action, 6 REV. LITIG. 339, 364 (1987); Scott Richardson, Attorney 
General’s Warning:  Legislation May Now Be Hazardous to Tobacco Companies’ Health, 28 
AKRON L. REV. 291, 312–21 (1995) (providing a general background regarding tobacco 
legislation and descriptions of multiple tobacco-related state and federal cases); see also Tax 
Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324 (1982) (taxing 
specific products such as tobacco and alcohol, also known as a sin tax).  In 1984, Congress 
decided to add content to the “is dangerous” assertion by mandating the use of four 
warnings of specific health effects.  Karjeker, supra, at 345.  Congress required 
manufacturers to print one of the following four warnings on their cigarette packages: 
SURGEON GENERAL’S WARNING:  Smoking Causes Lung Cancer, 
Heart Disease, Emphysema, and May Complicate Pregnancy[;] 
SURGEON GENERAL’S WARNING:  Quitting Smoking Now Greatly 
Reduces Serious Risks to Your Health[;] 
SURGEON GENERAL’S WARNING:  Smoking By Pregnant Women 
May Result in Fetal Injury, Premature Birth, And Low Birth Weight[; 
or] 
SURGEON GENERAL’S WARNING:  Cigarette Smoke Contains 
Carbon Monoxide. 
Comprehensive Smoking Education Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-474, 98 Stat. 2200 (1984) 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006)). 
74 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., REGULATING TOBACCO—AN FDA PERSPECTIVE, 
http://www.fda.gov/TobaccoProducts/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/uc
m171683.htm (last visited Oct. 3, 2010).  The Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco 
Control Act empowers the FDA with the broad authority to: 
Requir[e] companies who manufacture or import tobacco products to 
provide FDA with a listing of the amounts of all ingredients in the 
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California first introduced the bill in the House of Representatives as 
H.R. 1256.75  In his opening remarks of a floor debate, Representative 
Waxman asserted that in the past tobacco companies misled the 
American public, and if the bill passed, it would be a “great victory for 
all Americans, especially our children.”76  A number of Representative 
Waxman’s colleagues expressed concern that the FDA would be 
overburdened and the FSPTCA underfunded if the Act passed.77  The 
                                                                                                             
tobacco products they produce[;] . . . [r]equire companies to provide 
information about the amount of nicotine in their products to FDA and 
the public[;] . . . [w]hen appropriate for protecting public health, to 
adopt standards for nicotine yields and for the reduction or 
elimination of other harmful substances that may be present in tobacco 
products[;] [r]equir[e] that FDA must review an application and 
determine the product meets certain standards before tobacco 
products can be marketed and promoted as being “light,” “mild” or 
“low”[;] Premarket review by FDA is also required for tobacco 
products that were not commercially marketed as of February 15, 2007, 
or were modified after that date[;] [r]equir[e] the warnings on tobacco 
products to cover 50 percent of the front and back panels of the 
package and that text be large and legible[;] . . . issue regulations 
regarding the advertising of, and access to, tobacco products[; and] 
[e]stablish[] a Tobacco Products Scientific Advisory Committee to 
provide advice, information, and recommendations to FDA, such as on 
safety, dependence, or other health issues related to tobacco products. 
Id.  The law also “contains provisions designed to limit young people’s access to tobacco 
products, as well as restrictions on marketing to curb the appeal of these products to 
minors.”  Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 31, 458 (July 1, 
2009); see also Effective Dates of New FDA Tobacco Law Provisions, CAMPAIGN FOR TOBACCO-
FREE KIDS, http://www.tobaccofreekids.org/reports/fda/fda_effective_dates.pdf (last 
visited Oct. 3, 2010) (providing a timeline for implementation of the FSPTCA). 
75 155 CONG. REC. H2923 (daily ed. March 3, 2009) (statement of Rep. Waxman).  This bill 
was passed in the House of Representatives on April 2, 2009, by recorded vote.  155 CONG. 
REC. H4414 (daily ed. April 2, 2009)  The totals were 298 ayes, 112 noes, and 21 not voting.  
Id.  The bill passed in the Senate on June 11, 2009, by roll call vote.  155 CONG. REC. S6501 
(daily ed. June 11, 2009).  The totals were 79 yeas, 17 nays, and 3 not voting.  Id. 
76 155 CONG. REC. H4318–39 (daily ed. Apr. 1, 2009) (statement of Rep. Waxman).  Rep. 
Waxman further stated, “[i]n 1996, the Food and Drug Administration tried to regulate 
tobacco products, but the Supreme Court told them that they needed Congress to give 
them specific legal authority.  Now, 13 years later, here we are finally giving FDA that 
authority to regulate the leading preventable cause of death in America.”  Id. 
77 Id.  Representative Waxman addressed this concern by stating the following: 
[t]he tobacco program will be fully funded through a new user fee 
paid for by the industry.  That money will go exclusively to the new 
tobacco center and will be enough for FDA to handle this task well.  
Furthermore, by doing so, we will ensure that the new tobacco 
program will have no impact on other missions at the Food And Drug 
Administration. 
Id.; see also Halimah Abdullah, Senators Who Opposed Tobacco Bill Received Top Dollar from 
Industry, MCCLATCHY NEWSPAPERS, June 11, 2009, http://www.mcclatchydc.com/257/ 
story/69925.html (providing statements from various Senators who believe the FDA lacks 
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Congressional Budget Office (“CBO”), however, estimates that the 
FSPTCA will reduce the budget deficit by $200 million over the 2010 to 
2014 period and by $800 million over the 2010 to 2019 period.78  
Moreover, the FSPTCA assesses fees on companies that manufacture or 
import tobacco products and utilizes the money in a discretionary fund 
to regulate the tobacco products.79  The CBO estimates that the amount 
of tax revenues and settlement funds collected by state and local 
governments may decline due to reduced consumption of tobacco 
products.80 
                                                                                                             
the resources needed to direct and enforce the FSPTCA).  But see 155 CONG. REC. H4341 
(Apr. 1, 2009) (describing that the FDA does not have the resources necessary to more 
comprehensively regulate the tobacco industry). 
78 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, COST ESTIMATE, H.R. 1256: FAMILY SMOKING 
PREVENTION AND TOBACCO CONTROL ACT (Mar. 16, 2009), available at 
http://www.govtrack.us/data/us/111/bills.cbo/h1256.pdf; see also FDA, FISCAL YEAR 
2010 CONGRESSIONAL JUSTIFICATION, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:  INTRODUCTION AND MISSION, 
available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/ReportsManualsForms/Reports 
/BudgetReports/UCM153491.pdf (providing an overview of the proposed 2010 FDA 
budget). 
79 FDA, FISCAL YEAR 2010 CONGRESSIONAL JUSTIFICATION, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:  
INTRODUCTION AND MISSION, supra note 78.  The legislation would authorize the quarterly 
assessment of fees on manufacturers and importers of such products.  It would authorize 
the appropriation of assessments equal to $85 million in 2009, $235 million in 2010, $450 
million in 2011, $477 million in 2012, $505 million in 2013, $534 million in 2014, $566 million 
in 2015, $599 million in 2016, $635 million in 2017, $672 million in 2018, and $712 million in 
2019 and each subsequent year.  Id.  In addition, the Congressional Budget Office estimates 
that implementing the program to assess fees to cover new FDA costs associated with 
regulating tobacco would reduce net discretionary outlays by $149 million over the 2010–
2014 period and by $70 million over the 2010–2019 period because the spending of fees 
would lag behind their collection.  Id.  Further, the CBO articulated that 
H.R. 1256 would impose a number of private-sector mandates, as 
defined in UMRA, on companies that manufacture or import tobacco 
products.  CBO estimates that the total direct cost of these mandates 
would exceed the threshold established by UMRA ($139 million in 
2009, adjusted annually for inflation) in each year, beginning with 
2010.  The bill would assess a fee on manufacturers and importers of 
tobacco products to cover the cost to FDA of regulating those products.  
The aggregate payments would sum to $235 million in 2010, and rise to 
more than $500 million a year by 2013. 
Id.; see 155 CONG. REC. H4339 (daily ed. Apr. 1, 2009) (explaining that the FSPTCA will be 
fully funded through a new user fee paid for by the tobacco industry); U.S. FOOD & DRUG 
ADMIN., TOBACCO PRODUCT FEES, http://www.fda.gov/ForIndustry/UserFees/Tobacco 
ProductFees/default.htm (last visited Oct. 3, 2010) (stating that the user fee program will 
generate $4.5 billion from 2009–2018); U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., USER FEES, 
http://www.fda.gov/ForIndustry/UserFees/default.htm (last visited Oct. 3, 2010) 
(discussing the user fee program and funding for years 2009–2018). 
80 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, COST ESTIMATE, H.R. 1256: FAMILY SMOKING 
PREVENTION AND TOBACCO CONTROL ACT (Mar. 16, 2009), available at 
http://www.govtrack.us/data/us/111/bills.cbo/h1256.pdf.  The CBO stated that 
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Congress’s rationale behind the enactment of the FSPTCA was that 
advertising, marketing, and the promotion of tobacco products attracts 
young people to use tobacco products, and these efforts have resulted in 
increased use.81  Congress expressed concern that promotional 
marketing and advertising methods expose minors to tobacco products.82  
                                                                                                             
[i]n 2008, state and local governments collected about $19 billion in 
revenues from excise and general sales taxes levied on tobacco 
products.  CBO estimates that this bill would lower consumption of 
those products and that excise taxes collected by state and local 
governments would fall by about $20 million in 2010, with that 
reduction growing to over $330 million in 2014.  Similarly, the CBO 
estimates that state and local governments would see a decline in 
sales-tax revenues of about $170 million over the 2010–2014 period. 
Id. 
81 Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, 123 Stat. 
1776, 1777 (2009) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (2006 & Supp. 2009)).  This Act 
states: 
 Tobacco use is the foremost preventable cause of premature death 
in America.  It causes over 400,000 deaths in the United States each 
year, and approximately 8,600,000 Americans have chronic illnesses 
related to smoking. 
 Reducing the use of tobacco by minors by 50 percent would 
prevent well over 10,000,000 of today’s children from becoming 
regular, daily smokers, saving over 3,000,000 of them from premature 
death due to tobacco-induced disease. 
Id. (original numbering omitted).  “In 2005, the cigarette manufacturers spent more than 
$13,000,000,000 to attract new users, retain current users, increase current consumption, 
and generate favorable long-term attitudes toward smoking and tobacco use.”  Id. § 1333, 
123 Stat. at 1778, ¶16.  Numerous reports conclude that tobacco use is harmful for an 
individual’s health largely due to the chemicals included in cigarettes, cigars, and 
smokeless tobacco.  See ANTHONY L. KOMAROFF, HARVARD MEDICAL SCHOOL FAMILY 
HEALTH GUIDE 58 (1999) (providing an overview of the deleterious effects of tobacco use).  
According to Komaroff, “[t]obacco smoke contains more than 4,000 chemicals, many of 
which are known to be carcinogens (cancer-causing agents). . . . Nicotine is an addictive 
chemical that, when absorbed through the lungs, affects the cardiovascular and nervous 
systems.”  Id.  More specifically, “[s]moking has been established as a factor in the 
development of coronary artery disease; lung cancer; bronchitis; emphysema; cancer of the 
larynx; lip, and oral cavity; cancer of the bladder and stomach; duodenal ulcer; and 
allergies.”  GORDON EDLIN & ERIC GOLANTY, HEALTH & WELLNESS 396 (10th ed. 2010). 
82 Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act § 1333.  Congress also found 
that 
 [c]hildren are exposed to substantial and unavoidable tobacco 
advertising that leads to favorable beliefs about tobacco use, plays a 
role in leading young people to overestimate the prevalence of tobacco 
use, and increases the number of young people who begin to use 
tobacco. 
. . . . 
 Children are more influenced by tobacco marketing than adults:  
more than 80 percent of youth smoke three heavily marketed brands, 
while only 54 percent of adults, 26 and older, smoke these same 
brands. 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 45, No. 2 [2011], Art. 7
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol45/iss2/7
2011] Regulating Energy Drinks 707 
“Through advertisements during and sponsorship of sporting events, 
tobacco has become strongly associated with sports and has become 
portrayed as an integral part of sports and the healthy lifestyle 
associated with rigorous sporting activity.”83  The FSPTCA regulations 
will further the government’s substantial interest in preventing life-
threatening health consequences to the populace and advance the goal of 
reducing tobacco usage by the youth of America.84  As a result of 
ratification of the FSPTCA, the United States may possibly become a 
model nation piloting the pathway to a healthier public that is less 
dependent on tobacco.85  Congress can further this aim of developing a 
healthier public by uniting with other foreign nations in their endeavor 
to regulate heavily caffeinated beverages, such as energy drinks.86 
D. The Thirst for Regulation in America and the Nourishment of Regulation 
Abroad 
As the market for energy drinks in the United States increases, so 
does the push for FDA regulation.87  Compared to its regulation 
                                                                                                             
 Tobacco company documents indicate that young people are an 
important and often crucial segment of the tobacco market. 
Id. § 1333, 123 Stat. at 1778, ¶¶20, 23, 24 (original numbering omitted). 
83 Id.; see also supra note 52 (discussing the energy drink target market and advertising 
efforts by energy drink manufacturers). 
84 Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, § 1333, 123 Stat. at 1779; see 
Barak Y. Orbach, The New Regulatory Era—An Introduction, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 559, 561–65 
(2009) (discussing regulatory trends); Justice Sonia Sotomayor & Nicole A. Gordon, 
Returning Majesty to the Law and Politics:  A Modern Approach, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 35, 40 
(1996) (noting that many believe that reliance on regulatory measures may decrease 
personal responsibility and accountability); see also Credit Card Accountability 
Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009 (“the Credit CARD Act”), Pub. L. No. 111-24, 123 
Stat. 1734 (2009) (illustrating that personal responsibility is essential to the success of 
regulation); Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, Pub. L. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009) (expanding the 
scope of protection against discrimination for employees); Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & 
Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007) (prompting the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act); Remarks by 
President Barack Obama at Signing of the Credit Card Accountability, Responsibility and 
Disclosure Act (May 22, 2009) (underscoring the tension between responsibility and 
regulation). 
85 See supra note 81 (providing the goals of tobacco regulation through the FSPTCA). 
86 See infra Part II.D (explaining how many foreign nations regulate heavily caffeinated 
beverages). 
87 See generally Reissig, supra note 52, at 2 (discussing beverage regulatory aspects).  In 
2008, neuroscientist Roland Griffiths from Johns Hopkins School of Medicine in Baltimore 
wrote to the FDA urging the agency to require manufacturers to list caffeine content of 
energy drinks on the can, to set a threshold on the amount of stimulant in the drinks, and 
to require conspicuous warning labels.  Weise, supra note 49, at 6D.  One hundred scientists 
and physicians joined Griffiths in writing letters to the FDA requesting heightened 
regulation of energy drinks because the drinks’ high caffeine content puts young drinkers 
at risk for caffeine intoxication and alcohol-related injuries.  Id.  Griffiths also claimed that 
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regarding over-the-counter (“OTC”) caffeine-containing stimulants, the 
FDA is lenient in regulating the caffeine content of energy drinks and 
permits manufacturers to market and sell their products devoid of 
warning labels that would recommend proper consumption and display 
the amount of caffeine contents.88  According to the FDA, an OTC 
product identified as a “stimulant” or “alertness aid” must display 
specific warnings on the packaging.89  Moreover, 
[i]t is a striking inconsistency that, in the U.S. an OTC 
stimulant medication containing 100 mg of caffeine per 
tablet (e.g. NoDoz) must include . . . warnings, whereas 
a 500 mg energy drink can be marketed with no such 
warnings and no information on caffeine dose amount 
in the product.90 
                                                                                                             
because federal law does not require energy drink companies to disclose the amount of 
caffeine in their drinks, it “is like having a glass of alcohol to drink . . . and you don’t know 
whether you’re drinking straight vodka or beer.”  Mayhood, supra note 49. 
88 Reissig, supra note 52, at 2.  The energy drink market is not slowing down, and energy 
drink manufacturers are trying to “one-up” each other; thus, “energy shots” have entered 
the picture.  See William Neuman, “Energy Shots” Stimulate Power Drink Sales, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 11, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/11/business/11energy.html.  Neuman 
explains the following: 
The two-ounce drinks, which give people a concentrated dose of 
caffeine, B vitamins and amino acids, were all but unheard-of four 
years ago.  Today they are the hottest drink category in the country, 
with sales expected to almost double this year from last, to about $700 
million. . . . The market is dominated by a tiny company in suburban 
Detroit called Living Essentials, which began test sales in late 2004 of a 
product called 5-Hour Energy, packaged in small plastic bottles. 
Id. 
89 21 C.F.R. § 340.50 (2009).  The statute identifies one of the labeling requirements as 
follows: 
The labeling of the product contains the following warnings under the 
heading “Warnings”: 
 (1) “The recommended dose of this product contains about as 
much caffeine as a cup of coffee.  Limit the use of caffeine-containing 
medications, foods, or beverages while taking this product because too 
much caffeine may cause nervousness, irritability, sleeplessness, and, 
occasionally, rapid heart beat.” 
 (2) “For occasional use only.  Not intended for use as a substitute 
for sleep.  If fatigue or drowsiness persists or continues to recur, 
consult a” (select one of the following:  “physician” or “doctor”). 
 (3) “Do not give to children under 12 years of age.” 
Id. § 340.50(c). 
90 See Reissig, supra note 52, at 3 (describing the regulatory guidelines OTC caffeine 
stimulants must follow). 
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Although there is dispute regarding whether energy drink and 
caffeine consumption is beneficial, there is nonetheless a consensus 
among researchers that caffeine consumption can result in adverse 
health consequences, especially at high doses.91  For example, such 
adverse effects of over-consumption may include nervousness, 
irritability, sleeplessness, increased urination, abnormal heart rhythms 
(arrhythmia), decreased bone density, and upset stomach.92  Another 
harmful consequence of over-consumption is caffeine intoxication—a 
                                                 
91 Simon & Mosher, supra note 46.  One modern study concluded that 
[c]affeine does not improve maximal oxygen capacity directly, but 
could permit the athlete to train at a greater power output and/or to 
train longer.  It has also been shown to increase speed and/or power 
output in simulated race conditions.  These effects have been found in 
activities that last as little as 60 seconds or as long as 2 hours. 
GRAHAM, T.E., Caffeine and Exercise: Metabolism, Endurance and Performance, Abstract, 31 
SPORTS MED. 785–807 (2001), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/11583104.  
“The limited information available suggests that caffeine non-users and users respond 
similarly and that withdrawal from caffeine may not be important.”  Id.  See Jerome H. 
Jaffe, Psychoactive Substance Use Disorders, in COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 642, 
683 (1989) (illustrating that energy drinks are one of the most widely used psychoactive 
drugs in the world); see also Wallace B. Pickworth, Caffeine Dependence, LANCET, Apr. 29, 
1995, at 1066 (stating that caffeine is “a psychoactive drug used by 80% of the population of 
the USA”), cited in Gwendolyn Prothro, The Caffeine Conundrum:  Caffeine Regulation in the 
United States, 27 CUMB. L. REV. 65, 66 (1996–1997) (describing the scientific composition of 
caffeine). 
92 Heneman & Zidenberg-Cherr, supra note 46; see Drug Products for Over-the-Counter 
Human Use, 53 Fed. Reg. 6100, 6103 (Feb. 29, 1988) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 340); ANN 
MARIE SCHULTZ, ET AL., CITIZEN PETITION FOR NEW LABELING REQUIREMENTS FOR CAFFEINE 
IN FOOD, Jan. 15, 2006, available at http://www.fda.gov/OHRMS/DOCKETS/dockets/ 
06p0039/06p-0039-cp00001-01-vol1.pdf (providing a description of the adverse effects of 
caffeine consumption); Prema B. Rapuri et al., Caffeine Intake Increases the Rate of Bone Loss in 
Elderly Women and Interacts with Vitamin D Receptor Genotypes, 74 AM. J. CLINICAL 
NUTRITION 694, 699 (2001) (follow http://www.ajcn.org/cgi/content/full/74/5/ 694 
hyperlink; then follow “Full Text (PDF)” hyperlink) (finding a correlation between bone 
loss in post-menopausal women and caffeine consumption); News Release, Duke 
University Medical Center, Caffeine’s Effects are Long-Lasting and Compound Stress, 
http://www.dukemednews.org/news/article.php?id=5687 (full article appears in the 
July/August, 2002 issue of Psychosomatic Medicine) (providing the findings of a study 
comparing caffeine consumption with stress levels); Denise Grady, Pregnancy Problems Tied 
to Caffeine, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/21/health/ 
21caffeine.html (finding that the risk of miscarriage significantly increases with caffeine 
consumption); James Lane et al., Cutting Caffeine May Help Control Diabetes, DUKE MEDICINE 
NEWS & COMMUNICATIONS, Jan. 28, 2008, http://www.dukehealth.org/Health_Library/ 
News/10226 (last visited Sept. 14, 2010) (finding that excessive caffeine consumption 
undermines efforts to control type 2 diabetes); Alex M. McDonald, Energy Drinks and 
Exercise, POWERBAR, http://www.powerbar.com/articles/109/Energy_Drinks_and_ 
Exercise.aspx (last visited Oct. 3, 2010); Watch Your Caffeine Intake if You Are Prone to Kidney 
Stones, MED. NEWS TODAY (Sept. 5, 2004), available at http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/ 
articles/12937.php (summarizing a study regarding caffeine’s effects on the development 
of kidney stones). 
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syndrome recognized by the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders and the World Health Organization’s International 
Classification of Diseases.93  Due in large part to the soaring popularity 
of energy drinks and a steadily increasing amount of consumption by 
young people, more serious cases of caffeine intoxication are being 
reported in poison centers.94  The media has reported multiple cases of 
                                                 
93 AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF 
MENTAL DISORDERS 212 (Am. Psychiatric Ass’n 1994); WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, THE 
ICD-10 CLASSIFICATION OF BEHAVIOURAL AND MENTAL DISORDERS:  DIAGNOSTIC CRITERIA 
FOR RESEARCH, 5–6, available at http://www.who.int/substance_abuse/terminology/ 
ICD10ResearchDiagnosis.pdf (last visited Oct. 3, 2010); Reissig, supra note 52, at 4. 
94 Heneman & Zidenberg-Cherr, supra note 46.  “A recently-released report from 
University of Massachusetts Medical School noted 4600 caffeine-related calls to the 
American Association of Poison Control Centers in 2005, the most recent data available.  
More than half involved people under 19, and 2345 required treatment in a health care 
facility.”  “Caffeine Intoxication” Cases on Rise, CBS NEWS (July 17, 2008), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/07/17/earlyshow/health/main4267600.shtml?so
urce=RSSattr=Health_4267600.  Caffeine abuse is occurring more frequently in the United 
States and one study states: 
Forty-one cases of caffeine abuse from caffeine-enhanced beverages 
were reported to a U.S. poison control center from 2002 to 2004.  
Another U.S. poison control center reported nine cases of adverse 
reactions to the energy drink Redline from January 2004 to March 2006.  
Eight of the nine patients were male, the youngest being 13 years of 
age. 
Reissig, supra note 52, at 5 (citation omitted).  Research scientist Kathleen E. Miller of the 
University of Buffalo Research Institute on Addictions examined the relationships between 
energy drink consumption and risk-taking in college students and found a positive 
correlation between consumption and substance abuse and unsafe sexual activity.  See 
Kathleen E. Weaver, Energy Drinks Linked to Risk-Taking Behaviors Among College Students, 
UNIV. OF BUFF. RES. INST. ON ADDICTIONS (July 24, 2008), http://www.ria.buffalo.edu/ 
news/2008-07-24.html.  Recently, 795 Western New York college students participated in 
the study, which concluded: 
Frequent energy drink consumers (six or more days a month), 
according to Miller’s findings, were approximately three times as 
likely as less frequent energy drink consumers or non-consumers to 
have smoked cigarettes, abused prescription drugs and been in a 
serious physical fight in the year prior to the survey.  They reported 
drinking alcohol, having alcohol-related problems and using 
marijuana about twice as often as non-consumers.  They were also 
more likely to engage in other forms of risk-taking, including unsafe 
sex, not using a seatbelt, participating in an extreme sport and doing 
something dangerous on a dare.  The associations with smoking, 
drinking, alcohol problems and illicit prescription use were found for 
white but not black students. 
Id.; see Heather Warlick, Energy Drink Use May Cause Addiction, Risky Behavior Email, 
OKLAHOMAN (Okla. City, Okla.), Nov. 4, 2008, at 2E (providing statistics regarding the 
behavior of students following drinking alcohol with energy drinks); Public Health; Study 
Shows Energy Drink “Cocktails” Lead to Increased Injury Risk, MED. LETTER ON THE CDC & 
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caffeine toxicity resulting from consumption of energy drinks affecting a 
wide range of consumers from middle school-aged children to 
professional athletes.95  One serious case occurred in Australia where a 
twenty-eight-year-old motocross athlete’s heart stopped in a competition 
because he had consumed eight cans of Red Bull over five hours.96  As 
evidenced by such tragic anecdotes, different individuals respond 
differently to caffeine—non-habitual users may experience dramatic 
boosts in athletic and cognitive performance because they are not 
tolerant to caffeine’s stimulant effect.97 
                                                                                                             
FDA VIA NEWSRX.COM & NEWSRX.NET, Nov. 25, 2007, at 74 (providing the results of a Wake 
Forest University School of Medicine study regarding alcohol and energy drinks). 
95 Heneman & Zidenberg-Cherr, supra note 46.  For instance, the King Philip Regional 
School District in Massachusetts decided to rewrite the middle school student handbook to 
discourage the consumption of energy drinks after a student got sick on a school ski trip.  
Michele Morgan Bolton, Some Schools Put the Lid on High-Caffeine Beverages; Say Energy 
Drinks Pose Health Risk Packed With Caffeine, BOST. GLOBE, July 25, 2009, at 1.  Parents and 
school officials from Dudley-Charlton School Committee became concerned when some 
middle school students were “bouncing off the walls as the first bell of the day rang, with 
racing pulses and pounding hearts, and then suffering a sluggish crash an hour or two 
later.”  Id.  One death apparently linked to the consumption of Red Bull made the headlines 
in 2000 when Irish athlete, Ross Cooney, eighteen, died of sudden adult death syndrome 
hours after drinking four cans of the drink and playing in a basketball match.  Following 
the incident, France prohibited the energy drink, but it removed the ban only days later.  
However, in countries such as Norway, Uruguay, and Denmark, it remains banned.  See 
French Ban on Red Bull (Drink) Upheld by European Court, MEDICAL NEWS TODAY, Feb. 8, 
2004, http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/5753.php.  But see NANCY CLARK, 
NANCY CLARK’S SPORTS NUTRITION GUIDEBOOK 178–79 (Heather Healy ed., Human 
Kinetics 4th ed. 2008) (1990) (stating that energy drink consumption can enhance athletic 
performance); BENNETT ALAN WEINBERG & BONNIE K. BEALER, THE CAFFEINE ADVANTAGE:  
HOW TO SHARPEN YOUR MIND, IMPROVE YOUR PHYSICAL PERFORMANCE, AND ACHIEVE YOUR 
GOALS—THE HEALTHY WAY 14 (2002) (describing the benefits of caffeine). 
96 Daniel Dasey, Man’s Heart Stops After Red Bull Overdose, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, 
Aug. 19, 2007, http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2007/08/18/1186857834956.html.  Dr. 
Malcolm Barlow, a cardiologist who treated Mr. Penbross at Newcastle’s John Hunter 
Hospital, said it appeared that excessive consumption of energy drinks had precipitated 
the heart attack.  Id.  He further stated that Mr. Penbross had no other risk factors apart 
from smoking and Mr. Penbross had previously told Dr. Barlow that he experienced chest 
pain at times when his intake of the drinks was high.  Id. 
97 Id.  According to Nancy Clark: 
A study comparing regular caffeine users to nonusers reports that the 
nonusers lasted eight and a half minutes longer when biking very hard 
to exhaustion, as compared with when they had no preexercise 
caffeine.  The regular caffeine users exercised for only four minutes 
longer when they had the caffeine fix. 
CLARK, supra note 95, at 179.  Because there is such a variance of efficacy with a drug like 
caffeine, dosage is determined by these factors:  “[y]our individual sensitivity to caffeine 
(determined by genetics, personality type, state of health, and other factors)[; t]he rate at 
which you metabolize caffeine[; and t]he benefit you are trying to receive from caffeine.”   
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Regarding neurological effects, some studies show that the benefits 
of caffeine ingestion depend on an intricate alteration of 
neurotransmitters and an increased production of dopamine and 
serotonin.98  As a result, caffeine can control neurotransmitters in a 
manner that can improve temperament, reduce pain, suppress appetite, 
and even protect brain cells from disease.99  Remarkably, a few experts 
describe caffeine as the pop-icon drug of the twenty-first century—one 
that offers the widest range of benefits among all drugs in the 
pharmacopoeia.100  Regardless, the benefits of caffeine are complex and 
variable, and according to those experts, “[w]hen using caffeine, the 
guiding motto must be ‘[k]now thyself.’”101  These circumstances 
prompted legislators in the United States and abroad to introduce 
legislation that imposes stringent labeling requirements on energy drinks 
and their packaging.102 
For European Union (“EU”) member states, it is an arduous task to 
maintain stringent regulations on energy drinks due to conflicts with EU 
                                                                                                             
WEINBERG & BEALER, supra note 95, at 14.  See id. (providing an overview of caffeine’s 
benefits). 
98 See id. at 11–12. 
99 Id.  Other benefits of caffeine consumption include the following: 
As a stimulant, it perks us up in the morning and generally restore[s] 
mental alertness or wakefulness during [states of] fatigue or 
drowsiness.  It may improve semantic memory, logical reasoning, 
recall and recognition memory, at least transiently.  As an analgesic 
adjuvant in aspirin and aspirin/acetaminophen combinations, it helps 
to reduce pain.  And as an ingredient in menstrual drug products, it is 
effective in combating the fatigue and water weight gain associated 
with menstrual and pre-menstrual periods. 
Prothro, supra note 91, at 68–69 (alterations in original) (footnotes omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
100 WEINBERG & BEALER, supra note 95, at 1. 
101 Id.  The Yerkes-Dodson curve of caffeine activity illustrates the “highs” and “lows” 
caffeine users experience.  Id. at 14.  Psychologists theorize “that there is an optimum level 
of arousal for efficient performance.  Other scientists explain the up then down dynamics 
by theorizing that higher doses of caffeine have additional effects on the body that 
suppress performance.”  Id. (footnote omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
Weinberg and Bealer iterate that “as you increase your dose, the positive effects of caffeine 
increase until you reach a certain level, at which time these effects begin to reverse 
themselves.”  Id. 
102 See generally Reissig, supra note 52 (implying that Congress should enact legislation to 
protect Americans from the harmful effects of caffeine); Thaddeus Mason Pope, Balancing 
Public Health Against Individual Liberty:  The Ethics of Smoking Regulations, 61 U. PITT. L. REV. 
419, 433–34 (2000) (discussing the appropriateness for the government to intervene and 
regulate under certain circumstances). 
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trade agreements.103  The EU does require, however, that beverages in 
excess of 150 mg/L of caffeine contain a warning label next to the title of 
the product stating “[h]igh caffeine content” and the quantity of 
caffeine.104  France, Sweden, and Denmark originally restricted the sale 
of Red Bull, but following a slightly pro-energy drink decision by the 
European Court of Justice, they removed the ban.105  Non-member States, 
such as Norway, Iceland, and Turkey, however, may enact strict 
legislation to regulate energy drinks because, as non-member States, EU 
trade agreements do not bind them.106 
                                                 
103 EUROPEAN CENTRE FOR MONITORING ALCOHOL MARKETING, THE RAISE OF ALCOHOLIC 
ENERGY DRINKS IN EUROPE 3 (2008), available at http://www.alcoholreclame.nl/content/ 
bestanden/the_raise_of_alcoholic_energy_drinks_in_europe8.pdf. 
104 EUROPA, COMMISSION DIRECTIVE 2002/67/EC OF JULY 18, 2002 ON THE LABELLING OF 
FOODSTUFFS CONTAINING QUININE, AND OF FOODSTUFFS CONTAINING CAFFEINE, 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/consumers/product_labelling_and_packaging/l
21140_en.htm (follow “2002/67/EC” hyperlink). 
105 Id.  The European Court of Justice’s job is to ensure that EU legislation is interpreted 
and applied consistently in all EU countries so that the law is equal for everyone.  EUROPA, 
EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS AND OTHER BODIES, THE COURT OF JUSTICE, 
http://europa.eu/institutions/inst/justice/index_en.htm (last visited Sept. 14, 2010).  It 
ensures, for example, that individual national courts do not contradict each other on the 
same issue.  Id.  In Commission of the European Communities v. French Republic, 3.4.2004 
OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, 85/02 (Feb. 5, 2004), available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2004:085:0002:0003:EN:PDF, the Court 
of Justice held that the French Republic failed to fulfill its obligations under the European 
Commission Treaty 
by hindering the marketing in France of certain foodstuffs, such as 
food supplements and dietary products containing the substances L-
tartrate and L-carnitine, and confectionery and drinks to which certain 
nutrients have been added, without establishing that the marketing of 
such foodstuffs entails a real risk for public health. 
Id.  Prior to France’s efforts to ban Red Bull, Italy attempted unsuccessfully to ban the 
marketing of energy drinks in excess of a certain limit.  See Commission of the European 
Communities v. Italian Republic, 2.8.2003 OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, 
184/12 (June 19, 2003), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do? 
uri=OJ:C:2003:184:0012:0013:EN:PDF. 
106 EUROPEAN CENTRE FOR MONITORING ALCOHOL MARKETING, supra note 103, at 3.  
According to the USDA Foreign Agricultural Service: 
[a] regulation released [by Turkey] in April 2005 modified the energy 
drinks regulation and limited the caffeine levels to 320 mg per liter and 
required health warnings on the label.  On October 2006, another 
directive numbered 2006/47 lowered the caffeine level to 150 mg per 
liter, and required the labels to indicate a “Nutrition Facts” chart.  Also 
with this regulation, it is now required to indicate on the labels of 
energy drinks, “Should not be consumed by mixing with alcohol.  This 
is not a sports drink.  Not more than 500 ml should be consumed per 
day.  It is not recommended for children under 18, elderly, diabetics, 
pregnant or breastfeeding women, or people sensitive to caffeine.” 
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Currently, scientific researchers, psychiatrists, and law professors 
alike are expressing growing concern about the adverse effects of 
excessive caffeine consumption.107  Moreover, legislators are joining the 
bandwagon to “force drink-makers to come clean on caffeine,” especially 
those who produce and distribute alcoholic energy drinks.108  In 
                                                                                                             
USDA FOREIGN AGRICULTURAL SERVICES, GAIN REPORT, TURKEY: FOOD AND AGRICULTURAL 
IMPORT REGULATIONS AND STANDARDS—NARRATIVE (2009).  According to the Official 
Gazette, on July 4, 2006, the Republic of Turkey decided to limit caffeine amounts in energy 
drinks to 150 mg/L.  Id. at 6.  Individual energy-blend ingredients were limited as well.  Id. 
at 6–7.  For instance, inositol cannot exceed 100 mg/L, glucuronolactone 20 mg/L, and 
taurine 800 mg/L.  Id. 
 Australia, Thailand, Uruguay, and Canada have also banned or imposed regulations 
on the caffeine content and labeling of energy drinks. 
 See generally Weaver, supra note 94 (discussing energy drink regulation in foreign 
countries); Reissig, supra note 52, at 2 (discussing labeling related to energy drinks). 
Australia requires high-caffeinated beverages to display on the label advisory statements 
that the food contains caffeine and the food is not recommended for children, pregnant or 
lactating women, and individuals sensitive to caffeine.  FOOD STANDARDS AUSTRALIA NEW 
ZEALAND, STANDARD 2.6.4, FORMULATED CAFFEINATED BEVERAGES, available at 
http://www.foodstandards.gov.au/thecode/foodstandardscode/standard264formulate42
70.cfm (follow “PDF” hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 4, 2010).  In addition, the label on an 
energy drink must include an advisory statement such as, “[c]onsume no more than 
[amount of one-day quantity (as cans, bottles or mL )] per day.”  Id. (alterations in original).  
In Thailand in 2002, the Thai Food and Drug Administration (“Thai FDA”) ruled that 
advertisements for energy drinks be subject to certain restrictions on 
the grounds that they were “misleading.”  Officials said the 
advertisements appeared to be encouraging children to consume too 
many energy drinks, with potential ill-health effects.  After consulting 
with industry, the [Thai] FDA decided to mandate a health warning on 
all energy drink advertisements.  The depiction of sports stars and 
labourers in advertisements for energy drinks was also prohibited, but 
the threat to ban the use of celebrities in advertisements was not 
implemented. 
Corinna Hawkes, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, MARKETING FOOD TO CHILDREN:  THE 
GLOBAL REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT 32 (2004), available at http://whqlibdoc.who.int/ 
publications/2004/9241591579.pdf (footnotes omitted).  See generally Weaver, supra note 94 
(discussing regulations of energy drinks in various countries).  In 2004, Canada decided to 
permit sales of energy drinks but “now requires warning labels cautioning against use by 
children or pregnant women, use in large quantities, or use with alcohol.”  Id. 
107 See Reissig, supra note 52 (providing a background of the ill effects of energy drink 
consumption); SCHULTZ, supra note 92 (discussing physiological effects and illnesses that 
may arise from excessive caffeine ingestion).  The Food and Drug Law Class of Michigan 
State University College of Law, directed by Adjunct Professor Neal Fortin, submitted a 
Citizen Petition to the FDA “to request the Commissioner of Food and Drugs to issue a 
regulation that would efficaciously inform the general public about the quantitative 
caffeine content of the foods they consume.”  Id. at 1. 
108 Sen. Michael Switalski, Editorial, Force Drink-Makers to Come Clean on Caffeine, DETROIT 
NEWS, Apr. 10, 2009.  The caffeine regulation disagreement can actually be a catalyst for 
progress.  See, e.g., LLOYD ALBERT JOHNSON, A TOOLBOX FOR HUMANITY:  MORE THAN 9000 
YEARS OF THOUGHT 117 (2003) (providing thoughts and quotes about “Progress”).  In a 
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February 2009, Michigan Senator Michael Switalski introduced Michigan 
Senate Bill 230 that would require energy drink manufacturers to print 
the product’s caffeine content on the label.109  One month prior to the 
                                                                                                             
warning letter to Phusion Projects Inc. (“Phusion”), the FDA informed the company that 
the combination of ingredients (namely alcohol and caffeine), as it is used in its extremely 
popular alcoholic energy drink, “Four Loko,” render the beverage adulterated, as defined 
in section 402(a)(2)(c) of the FDCA.  WARNING LETTER:  PHUSION PROJECTS INC., 
INSPECTIONS, COMPLIANCE, ENFORCEMENT, AND CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS, U.S. FOOD AND 
DRUG ADMINISTRATION (Nov. 17, 2010), available at http://www.fda.gov/iceci/ 
enforcementactions/warningletters/ucm234023.htm.  Four Loko, sold in an enormous 23-
ounce can, containing twelve percent alcohol and an energy blend, is widely consumed by 
college-aged individuals callous to the beverage’s adverse effects.  Abby Goodnough, 
F.D.A. Expected to Take a Stand on Alcoholic Energy Drinks, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/16/us/16drinks.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1. In the 
warning letter, Joann M. Givens, Acting Director of the Chicago FDA Office of Compliance 
Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition, stated that 
[t]here is no food additive regulation authorizing the use of caffeine as 
a direct addition to alcoholic beverages, and we are not aware of any 
information to establish that caffeine added directly to alcoholic 
beverages is the subject of a prior sanction.  Likewise, we are not aware 
of any basis to conclude that caffeine is GRAS [“Genderally 
Recognized As Safe”] under these conditions of use. 
WARNING LETTER:  PHUSION PROJECTS INC., supra.  Givens further informed Phusion that it 
“should take prompt action to correct [the] violation and prevent its recurrence” and 
“[f]ailure to do so may result in enforcement action [such as seizure of the product and 
injunctions and prosecutions] without further notice.”  Id.  Phusion was allowed fifteen 
days to respond to the warning to state the specific steps it had taken to correct the 
violation and to assure that similar violations would not occur.  Id.  Phusion immediately 
released a public statement that it would remove the caffeine, guarana, and taurine from 
Four Loko and iterated that the company “works with its distributors to share information 
about the appropriate way to stock and market its products [and provides] point of sale 
information that reinforces the importance of asking for ID when selling any alcoholic 
beverage.”  News Release:  Phusion Projects to Remove Caffeine, Guarana and Taurine from 
Products, PHUSION PROJECTS (Nov. 16, 2010), http://www.phusionprojects.com/ 
media_reformulation.html.  Notably, the FDA also issued warning letters to Charge 
Beverages Corp. (maker of “Core”), New Century Brewing Co. (maker of “Moonshot”), 
and United Brands Company, Inc. (maker of “Joose” and “Max”).  Molly Peterson, 
Caffeinated Alcoholic Drinks Are Unsafe, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 17, 2010), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-11-17/caffeinated-alcohol-drinks-called-unsafe-
in-warning-by-u-s-regulators.html; FDA Warns Makers of Alcoholic Energy Drinks, FOX NEWS 
(Nov. 17, 2010), http://www.foxnews.com/health/2010/11/17/fda-warns-makers-
alcoholic-energy-drinks/. 
109 S. 230, 95th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2009).  In an editorial, Senator Switalski asserted, “I 
am a Democrat, but I got the two doctors in the Senate, both Republicans, to co-sponsor my 
caffeine bill.  You have a right to know the ingredients in your drink and your kid’s.  It 
should be on the label.”  Switalski, supra note 108.  Cf. Christine A. Klein, The Environmental 
Deficit:  Applying Lessons From the Economic Recession, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 651, 674 (2009) 
(“There is a growing acceptance of the value of federal regulation, at least to prevent 
egregious practices harmful to important national interests.”); David Leonhardt, A Free-
Market-Loving, Big-Spending, Fiscally Conservative Wealth Redistributionist, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
24, 2008, at 30 (providing a snapshot of America’s future economic policies); President’s 
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introduction of Switalski’s bill, Maine Representative Peggy Pendleton 
initiated her bill in the Maine House of Representatives that would 
prohibit the sale of energy drinks to minors.110  Danny Ford, a 
Representative from Kentucky, also introduced a bill that would make it 
illegal for stores to sell energy drinks to minors.111  With the healthcare 
debate at the forefront of American political thought, President Barack 
Obama declared that taxation of sugar-sweetened beverages, such as 
energy drinks, should be explored by Congress in order to reduce 
consumption and protect the public health.112  Before Congress reaches 
the decision to regulate, perhaps it could engage in the following 
inquiry:  first, assess the positive and negative health effects; second, if a 
health risk is present, determine the extent of regulation necessary; and 
third, ascertain whether adequate resources are available to enforce the 
regulation.113 
                                                                                                             
Remarks in New York City Regarding Financial Regulations, PUB. PAPERS (Sept. 14, 2009) 
(implying that Congress should enact common sense regulation to protect Americans). 
110 H.P. 12, 124th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Me. 2009).  Representative Pendleton’s bill was referred 
to the Committee on Health and Human Services, but the Senate voted to kill the bill 
pursuant to the Committee’s recommendation.  Kevin Miller, Bill Curtailing Sale of Energy 
Drinks Spiked, BANGOR DAILY NEWS, Feb. 5, 2009, available at 
http://www.bangordailynews.com/detail/98909.html. 
111 H.B. 374, 2008 Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2008).  Representative Ford’s bill defined energy drink 
as “a carbonated beverage that exceeds a caffeine content of seventy-one (71) milligrams 
per twelve (12) ounce serving and contains taurine and glucuronolactone.”  Id.  The bill 
died at the end of the 2008 Regular Session because it did not make it out of the Health & 
Welfare Committee.  Kentucky Legislature, H.B. 374, http://www.lrc.ky.gov/RECORD/ 
08RS/HB374.htm. (last visited Mar. 14, 2010). 
112 See generally Elizabeth Lopatto, Soft-Drink Tax Could Pare Waistlines, Cover Health-Care 
Costs, BLOOMBERG, Sept. 16, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=21070001 
&sid=aHd62qwNQt6g (describing obesity statistics in the United States and President 
Obama’s solution to the problem).  Public health and economic researchers posit that “[a] 
penny-per-ounce tax on soda and other sugary drinks would raise about $150 billion over a 
decade while slimming Americans’ waistlines.”  Id.  “The tax would apply to soft drinks, 
energy drinks, sports beverages and many juices and iced teas, but not sugar-free diet 
drinks.”  Soft Drink Tax Debate Rages On, CONVENIENCE STORE NEWS (Sept. 18, 2009), 
http://www.csnews.com/csn/cat_management/pack_bev/article_display.jsp?vnu_conte
nt_id=1004014003.  Moreover, 
[a] group of doctors, scientists and policy makers, though, have argued 
the tax could be a weapon to reduce obesity, similar to the way 
cigarette taxes have helped curb smoking. . . . They estimate a cent tax 
per ounce on sugary beverages would raise $14.9 billion in its first 
year, to be spent on health care initiatives, while also lower 
consumption of soda and lead to weight loss and reduced health risk 
for some Americans. 
Id. 
113 See Michael H. Cohen, U.S. Dietary Supplement Regulation:  Belief Systems and Legal 
Rules, 11 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 3, 8 (2000) (explaining the tensions between increased and 
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III.  ANALYSIS 
From its creation in 1938 to its present-day status as a multifaceted 
agency, the FDA continues to follow a straightforward but difficult 
congressional mandate—to protect the American public from 
adulterated and misbranded food, drugs, devices, and cosmetics.114  
Through the enactment of a bill that alters the language regarding the 
manufacturing, marketing, and distribution of dietary supplements, 
Congress could remedy the FDA’s lack of authority to regulate heavily 
caffeinated energy beverages.115  Part III.A explores economic, political, 
and philosophical elements that ultimately influence Congress’s decision 
of whether to increase FDA regulatory power.116  Part III.B evaluates the 
merits of caffeine regulation, focusing on the similarity between the 
health consequences of tobacco use and caffeine consumption.117  Part 
III.C explains whether the FDA, through its Congressional mandate and 
support of amended acts, possesses the jurisdiction to regulate energy 
drinks more effectively.118  Also, Part III.C compares this jurisdictional 
question to the public policy concerns raised by those in opposition to 
the newly enacted FSPTCA.119  Part III.D analyzes whether the FDA has 
the monetary and human capital required to keep pace with such a 
booming and rapidly expanding energy drink industry.120 
A. An Economic and Philosophic Assessment of Regulation Applied to Energy 
Drinks 
The dispute regarding whether Congress should afford the FDA 
broader authority to regulate consumer products like heavily caffeinated 
beverages contains both political and philosophical elements.121  Passage 
                                                                                                             
decreased governmental interference); Simon & Mosher, supra note 46, at 13 (proposing a 
proactive course of action to increase regulation of energy drinks). 
114 See supra note 25 (listing the multiple acts and amendments essential to the FDA’s 
creation and expansion). 
115 See infra Part IV (proposing a model regulation that affords the FDA with the power to 
regulate the manufacturing, marketing, and labeling of energy drinks). 
116 See infra Part III.A (evaluating various clashing arguments regarding increased FDA 
regulatory authority). 
117 See infra Part III.B (providing a comparison of the pharmacological and therapeutic 
effects of tobacco and energy drinks). 
118 See infra Part III.C (discussing whether the FDA has the power to regulate energy 
drinks currently classified as dietary supplements). 
119 See infra Part III.C (providing arguments in opposition to the FSPTCA that involve 
policy concerns). 
120 See infra Part III.D (discussing the plausibility concerning the notion that expanded 
FDA regulation is infeasible due to a scarcity of resources). 
121 See Cohen, supra note 113, at 8 (discussing the contradictory political and 
philosophical ideologies in light of the DSHEA).  Cohen generalizes that FDA regulation 
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of such legislation may hinge upon either the occurrence of a distinct 
political event or a philosophical shift of public opinion.122  Moreover, 
the regulation debate concerns the regulatory proposal, policy, values, 
and belief system of American society.123  Conceptually, the progression 
of regulation is illustrated sequentially in that, “[o]ne’s core belief system 
generates . . . [o]perative values, which generate . . . policy choices, which 
generate . . . the regulatory proposal and arguments for such a 
proposal.”124  This analytical framework, however, is unlikely to succeed 
seamlessly from the bottom level to the peak because of the reality that 
society has differing beliefs, morals, and values.125 
It is imperative to note that these differences in opinion give rise to 
three fundamental disagreements regarding increased FDA regulatory 
power:  whether the consumer is competent; whether paternalistic 
regulation is obligatory; and whether such regulation leads to the 
notorious slippery slope.126  The competent consumer approach is 
illustrated by both economic and common sense methodologies that 
suggest consumers continually and perhaps unknowingly engage in 
cost-benefit analyses.127  From a macroeconomic outlook, the cost-benefit 
methodology assumes that “all potential gains and losses from a 
                                                                                                             
presents a tension between paternalism and autonomy, but “[p]aternalism involves 
interference with autonomous choices.”  Id. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. at 12.  In his article, Michael H. Cohen provides a framework to analyze potential 
dietary supplement regulations in a format analogous to Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs—
each level generates the succeeding one.  Id. 
124 Id.  The bottom level, “Belief System,” “addresses what we ultimately believe about 
such large topics as truth, human existence, the nature and purpose of the body.  Do we 
ultimately believe that science has all the answers?”  Id. at 13.  The next level, “Values,” 
“asks who or what the rules and policies are attempting to protect. Is it the individual, the 
wealth of an industry or the power of a government institution?  What is foremost:  
consumer autonomy, medical authority, or regulatory control? What are the ultimate 
values guiding any balancing of these interests?”  Id.  The following level, “Policy,” “asks 
what overall stance should legislation or regulation adopt . . . .  What attitude should 
govern rule-making?  How should lawmakers, FDA officials, and others regard these 
products . . . in health care?  Should the posture be favorable or unfavorable?”  Id.  The top 
level, “Regulatory Proposal,” “asks what legal rule is the most appropriate. . . . Or should 
some intermediate category be created in which access is more carefully controlled by 
federal officials?”  Id. at 12. 
125 Cf. Cohen, supra note 113, at 21 (“By creatively examining our core beliefs and the 
values that underlie regulatory positions, the debate may be clarified, the doors of 
perception may be opened, and, ideally, the laws that govern self-care may more faithfully 
track the core of human aspirations toward health.”). 
126 See infra notes 127–33 (discussing the competent consumer argument); infra notes 138–
44 (discussing whether the FDA should act preemptively with regulation); infra notes 145–
52 (providing the slippery slope argument regarding regulation of caffeine). 
127 See SODERLIND, supra note 51, at 245 (describing the purpose of paternalistic 
regulation). 
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proposal are identified, converted into monetary units, and compared on 
the basis of decision rules to determine if the proposal is desirable from 
society’s standpoint.”128  However, on a microeconomic level and more 
relevant to energy drinks, the “consumer choice theory” demonstrates 
that individuals in a free-market setting choose products by weighing 
preference, price, and potential health consequences of the product.129 
Because consumers encounter trade-offs in their purchase decisions, 
they “must combine budget constraints (what they can afford), and 
preferences (what they would like to consume).”130  The economic model 
of the consumer choice theory can also drive the supposition that 
consumers are competent in their assessment concerning whether a 
product with potential adverse effects requires regulation to protect the 
public interest.131  In abstract economic terms, a regulation is “a 
commodity made available in the political marketplace and supplied by 
politicians and bureaucrats by reference to the demand of those who will 
benefit from its promulgation.”132  Accordingly, regulatory tension is 
present because individuals must face the consequences of their 
actions—they may enjoy all the benefits but will bear all the costs.133 
This regulatory conflict likely persists because of the notion that 
personal responsibility reduces the need for government regulation, and 
in turn, that regulation leads to dependency and irresponsibility.134  An 
excellent expression regarding personal responsibility and regulation is 
simply “that bad things may happen to responsible individuals and that 
                                                 
128 NAS, supra note 51, at 1–2. 
129 See McCann, supra note 51, at 1177 (explaining the consumer choice theory in terms of 
food purchases).  McCann states:  “In ranking, individuals determine the relative utility of 
one choice over another, balanced against abilities and budgetary constraints, which attach 
a relative cost to each prospective choice.”  Id. 
130 Theory of Consumer Choice, supra note 51. 
131 See generally THE POLITICS OF REGULATION:  INSTITUTIONS AND REGULATORY REFORMS 
FOR THE AGE OF GOVERNANCE, supra note 51, at 36 (providing a comparison of economic 
regulation and social regulation). 
132 Id.  On the other hand, this regulatory tradeoff may be: 
principally between politicians and industries which would benefit 
from regulatory subsidies and barriers to entry.  While different 
groups could furnish political support, the price necessary to secure 
the purchase, the transaction was most likely to be entered into by 
those groups which could coordinate their influence at lowest cost, 
thus tending to favour producers over, for example, consumers. 
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
133 SODERLIND, supra note 51, at 236.  Soderlind writes, “[a]s economists see it, when 
consumers are independent of one another any policy that imposes a change in behavior 
constitutes an unwelcome encroachment on personal freedom.”  Id. 
134 Orbach, supra note 84, at 562; see, e.g., Sotomayor, supra note 84, at 40 (“Some would 
argue that reliance on regulations alone defuses the notion of personal responsibility and 
accountability.”). 
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regulations may support and enable, rather than replace, personal 
responsibility.”135  When sentiments in Washington tend to favor 
increased regulation, policies held by those in power may impede the 
ideology that responsible individuals can effectively control their fate 
and improve their own well-being.136  Whether it actually materializes, 
President Obama and Congress seem to share a goal of reconciling the 
conflicting viewpoints concerning personal responsibility and regulation 
by offering a common sense approach to regulation.137 
                                                 
135 Orbach, supra note 84, at 562 (explaining the competent consumer theory in regard to 
government regulation).  A current example of a regulation that implicates personal 
responsibility is the Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009 
(“the Credit CARD Act”).  Pub. L. No. 111-24, 123 Stat. 1734 (2009).  Upon signing the 
Credit CARD Act, President Obama emphasized that: 
[Credit card] costs . . . often hit responsible credit card users. . . . With 
this bill, we’re putting in place some common-sense reforms designed 
to protect consumers . . . .  [W]e’re not going to give people a free pass; 
we expect consumers to live within their means and pay what they 
owe.  But we also expect financial institutions to act with the same 
sense of responsibility that the American people aspire to in their own 
lives. 
Orbach, supra note 84, at 561–62 (alterations in original).  President Obama’s remarks 
underscore the tension between responsibility and regulation in that both the “common 
practices of credit card companies hit many responsible credit card holders and that the 
Credit CARD Act does not relieve consumers of their responsibility to pay debts to credit 
card companies in full.”  Id. at 562; see Remarks by President Barack Obama at Signing of 
the Credit Card Accountability, Responsibility and Disclosure Act, supra note 84; see also 
Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, Pub. L. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009) (expanding the scope of 
protection against discrimination for employees).  The decision in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire 
& Rubber Co. (holding that employees are barred from filing pay discrimination claims 
based on employer’s decisions made 180 days ago or more) prompted President Obama to 
sign into law the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act.  “The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act overruled 
the Supreme Court decision, providing that the 180-day limitation starts with the last 
discriminatory act.”  Orbach, supra note 84, at 562, n.18. 
136 Id. at 565. 
137 See Klein, supra note 109, at 674 (“President Obama argued, ‘Now, if we’re honest with 
ourselves, . . . we have not always met [our] responsibilities—as a government or as a 
people. . . . Regulations were gutted for the sake of a quick profit at the expense of a 
healthy market.’”); Orbach, supra note 84, at 560 (noting that “[l]ike it or not, one of 
President Obama’s campaign promises for change was ‘common-sense regulation.’”).  
Barack Obama utilized this promise to distinguish himself from President Bush and his 
predecessors since President Reagan, who continuously deregulated markets.  See id. (“The 
promise for a ‘common-sense regulation,’ of course, also struck a sharp contrast between 
President Obama and his opponent, Senator John McCain.”).  In a interview for New York 
Times Magazine concerning new regulation, Barack Obama stated: 
Ronald Reagan . . . made people aware of the cost involved in 
government regulation. . . . Bill Clinton, to some extent, continued that 
pattern. . . . And George Bush took Ronald Reagan’s insight and ran it 
over a cliff. . . .  
 [W]hat we need to bring about is the end of the era of 
unresponsive and inefficient government and short-term thinking in 
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In cases involving products that create the risk of addiction or 
negative health consequences, some contend that government policies 
designed to combat those problems face the risk of paternalism.138  Many 
consumers opposed to paternalistic regulation invite danger and neglect 
warning labels, arguing that it is an essential right for Americans to be 
free to make their own mistakes.139  It is important to note, however, that 
paternalistic governmental control is not a novel principle—it has existed 
for millennia.140  At the heart of the regulatory debate is not necessarily 
the divisive distinction between “soft paternalism” and “hard 
paternalism,” but rather the risk of “slippage” from the former to the 
latter.141  Recently, a conceptual permutation of soft and hard 
                                                                                                             
government, so the government is laying the groundwork, the 
framework, the foundation for the market to operate effectively and 
for every single individual to be able to be connected with that market 
and to succeed in that market. 
Id. at 560, n.4 (alterations in original) (quoting Leonhardt, supra note 109, at 30 
(interviewing Barack Obama during his Presidential campaign)); see also President’s 
Remarks in New York City Regarding Financial Regulations, PUB. PAPERS (Sept. 14, 2009) 
(providing the full text of President Obama’s speech concerning a major overhaul of 
regulations of the financial system).  President Obama states: 
I have always been a strong believer in the power of the free 
market. . . . I believe that the role of the government is not to disparage 
wealth, but to expand its reach; not to stifle markets, but to provide the 
ground rules and level playing field that helps to make those markets 
more vibrant—and that will allow us to better tap the creative and 
innovative potential of our people. . . .  
 So I promise you, I did not run for President to bail out banks or 
intervene in capital markets.  But it is important to note that the very 
absence of common-sense regulations able to keep up with a fast-paced 
financial sector is what created the need for that extraordinary 
intervention—not just with our administration, but the previous 
administration.  The lack of sensible rules of the road, so often opposed 
by those who claim to speak for the free market, ironically led to a 
rescue far more intrusive than anything any of us—Democratic or 
Republican, progressive or conservative—would have ever proposed 
or predicted. 
President’s Remarks in New York City Regarding Financial Regulations, PUB. PAPERS (Sept. 
14, 2009) (emphasis added). 
138 See SODERLIND, supra note 51, at 245 (discussing the negative aspects of paternalism). 
139 Id.  According to Soderlind, “[m]ost of these cases involve consumers who persist in 
self-destructive behavior—smoking, drinking, sharing needles, and so on.”  Id. 
140 Rizzo & Whitman, supra note 51, at 685.  According to the Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy’s definition, “[p]aternalism is the interference of a state or an individual with 
another person, against their will, and defended or motivated by a claim that the person 
interfered with will be better off or protected from harm.”  Dworkin, supra note 51; see 
Glaeser, supra note 51, at 133 (providing an overview of hard and soft paternalism). 
141 See Orbach, supra note 84, at 569–70 (discussing “new paternalism” and objections to 
this ideology).  Orbach articulates that, in contrast to his theory of new paternalism, “Rizzo 
and Whitman focus on the slippery-slope criticism against regulation and specifically the 
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paternalism ideologies created what is now labeled the “new 
paternalism.”142  Advocates of new paternalism “distinguish their views 
from hard paternalism by emphasizing the moderate character of their 
proposals.”143  In other words, the new paternalists proffer a theoretically 
ideal standard conceivably applicable to energy drink regulation—a 
significant improvement in individual health and welfare possibly 
attained through little governmental intrusion that does not substantially 
restrict liberty or autonomy.144 
                                                                                                             
argument that soft paternalism may lead to hard paternalism, or in their words:  
‘moderation is not sustainable . . . slippage is most likely.’”  Id. at 569 (quoting Rizzo & 
Whitman, supra note 51, at 688). 
142 See Rizzo & Whitman, supra note 51, at 686 (“The new paternalism is supported by a 
growing body of research in behavioral economics showing that individuals are not fully 
‘rational,’ as economists understand that term, but instead are subject to a variety of 
cognitive errors and biases.”).  In contrast, “[w]hile Rizzo and Whitman raise serious valid 
concerns about potential sliding on slippery slopes, they do not examine actual changes in 
ideological hard paternalism with the rise of soft paternalism.  Ideological hard paternalism 
has always been around and probably will never disappear.”  Orbach, supra note 84, at 569 
(emphasis omitted).  Controversial examples of hard paternalism include: 
bans on sodomy, restrictions on same-sex intimate relationships, bans 
on abortions, bans on same-sex marriage, prohibitions against teaching 
evolution in public schools, and criminalization of fornication.  Some 
of these forms of hard paternalism were already abandoned because 
courts held them unconstitutional.  Others are still in effect at least in 
some states.  There is no conceptual link between soft paternalism that 
intends to improve individual decision-making and ideological hard 
paternalism.  The governing political trend in the new regulatory era, 
however, seems to be hostile toward ideological hard paternalism.  It is 
therefore unclear that the number of bans, mandatory requirements, 
and other forms of hard paternalism is likely to increase. 
Id. at 569–71 (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted). 
143 Rizzo & Whitman, supra note 51, at 687.  With regard to the conceptual permutation of 
soft and hard paternalism, “Christine Jolls and Cass Sunstein frequently refer to their 
proposals for debiasing behavior through law as a ‘middle ground’ between laissez-faire 
and more heavy-handed paternalism, one that is a ‘less intrusive, more direct, and more 
democratic response to the problem of bounded rationality.’”  Id. (footnotes omitted) 
(quoting Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 51, at 200–01). 
144 See id. at 687 (explaining the chief purpose of the new paternalism ideology).  Rizzo 
and Whitman challenge the new paternalism theory stating that 
accepting new paternalist policies creates a risk of accepting, in the 
long run, greater restrictions on individual autonomy than have 
heretofore been acknowledged.  Inasmuch as new paternalists claim to 
be interested in preserving autonomy, this surely must be taken into 
account as an unrecognized or unacknowledged cost to be balanced 
against any possible gains from their policies. 
Id. at 688 (footnote omitted). 
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A major setback for those in favor of more extensive caffeine 
regulation is the notorious slippery slope argument.145  “The term 
‘slippery’ slopes is shorthand for two related phenomena:  slippery slope 
arguments and slippery slope events.”146  Generally, there are at least 
two sets of actors involved:  the policymakers who created the legislation 
and the citizens the legislation affects.147  Citizens opposed to potentially 
rigid energy drink regulation pose a basic but formidable slippery slope 
argument—if the government wishes to control the manufacturing, 
marketing, and labeling of energy drinks, why not be consistent and 
require the same of coffee, tea, chocolate, or other caffeinated 
products?148 
                                                 
145 See id. at 689–90 (providing an overview of a slippery-slope argument).  Rizzo & 
Whitman note that “[a] slippery-slope argument (SSA) is an argument about how the 
acceptance of one argument (regarding a decision, act, or policy) may lead to the 
acceptance of other arguments (regarding other decisions, acts, or policies).”  Id.  In 
addition, “[a] slippery-slope event (SSE) refers to the actual manifestation of the events 
(decisions, acts, or policies) described in the SSA.”  Id. at 690 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
146 Id. at 689 (emphasis omitted).  Rizzo & Whitman point out that a slippery-slope 
argument “describes a process or mechanism by which accepting the initial argument and 
making the initial decision raise[s] the likelihood of accepting the later argument and 
making the later decision.”  Id. at 690 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
147 Id.  An example of a slippery-slope situation is as follows:  “the government imposes a 
policy that protects people from the consequences of their mistakes (e.g., national health 
insurance that covers the consequences of poor health choices), it may encourage moral 
hazard and thus result in more mistakes (more bad health choices).”  Id.  The traditional 
but highly controversial slippery-slope dilemma involves tobacco regulation.  See Pope, 
supra note 102, at 423 (discussing how tobacco regulations may infringe upon individual 
autonomy).  Regarding justification for government intrusion, Pope articulates that some 
commentators believe 
[t]he focus on the economic costs of personal behavior like 
smoking . . . seems to suggest that if it were possible to limit the costs 
to the smoker . . . there would be little justification for tolerating 
government intrusion.  According to the principle of the least 
restrictive alternative, they are absolutely correct.  If the harm that 
smokers cause can be eliminated, prevented, or ameliorated in a 
feasible way that does not interfere with smokers’ liberty, then ceteris 
paribus that alternative ought to be preferred.  Recouping the economic 
costs of smoking may increase the cost of cigarettes, but it interferes 
with liberty less than the direct prohibition of smoking. . . . On the 
contrary, the costs imposed by smokers cannot justify laws restricting 
smoking. . . . It would violate the least restrictive alternative principle 
to interfere with smokers’ liberty so as to prevent the costs (if any) of 
smoking when it is feasible, and in fact easier, to simply recover those 
costs. 
Id. at 443–44 (footnotes omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
148 See Brewington, supra note 53 (explaining opposing views regarding energy drink 
regulation).  Craig Stevens, speaking on behalf of the American Beverage Association in 
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Those who favor energy drink regulation commonly counter the 
slippery slope argument with the claim that a blanket regulation of 
caffeine would be politically impractical and nearly impossible to 
enforce.149  In addition, proponents of energy drink regulation could 
assert that energy drinks, especially when paired with alcohol, are 
extremely dangerous; thus, they are distinguishable from other regulated 
beverages such as soft drinks.150  Although the slippery slope concept is 
not novel or complex, it is likely the most compelling public policy 
argument against increased regulation of energy drinks.151  Energy 
drinks encompass many highs and lows, but because of the negative 
                                                                                                             
regard to Chad Reissig and Roland Griffiths’ energy drink review, states that “[i]t’s 
unfortunate that the authors of this article would attempt to lump all energy drinks 
together in a rhetorical attack when the facts of their review clearly distinguish the 
mainstream responsible players from novelty companies seeking attention and increased 
sales based solely on sensationalistic names and extreme caffeine content.”  Id. (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  Stevens also noted that 
the “mainstream” energy drinks that his organization represents have 
about half the caffeine content found in an average serving of coffee.  
A 12-ounce cup of coffee contains about 200 milligrams of caffeine.  An 
8.3-ounce can of Red Bull has 80 milligrams.  “So those suggesting that 
energy drinks should require warning labels should be aware of the 
slippery slope this would create . . . .  To be consistent, products at 
coffeehouses also would require such unnecessary labeling.” 
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  Conversely, Thaddeus Mason Pope claims that 
“[r]egulating public health risks with the goal of preventing harm to others has proven to 
be the most politically compelling rationale for government intervention.”  Pope, supra note 
102, at 433–34.  Pope counters the individual autonomy argument stating that 
[t]oday, the argument that “[i]t’s my body and I have the right to do as 
I please with it” is usually defeated not by denying the existence or 
validity of this right, but rather by illustrating that seemingly personal 
behavior does in fact violate the harm principle and is therefore subject 
to societal control. 
Id. at 437 (footnote omitted). 
149 See, e.g., id. at 433–34 (“Regulating public health risks with the goal of preventing 
harm to others has proven to be the most politically compelling rationale for government 
intervention.”).  Pope articulates that the “ethical foundation” for regulation can be found 
in the writings of John Stuart Mill: 
Mill maintained that “the only purpose for which power can be 
rightfully exercised over any member of a  civilized community 
against his will, is to prevent harm to others.”  That, he argued, is the 
extent of the power we ceded when we entered into the social contract 
forming the basis of human society. 
Id. at 434 (footnote omitted). 
150 See, e.g., Simon & Mosher, supra note 46, at 2 (discussing the need for energy drink 
regulation, especially those that include alcohol). 
151 See Brewington, supra note 53 and accompanying text (providing the slippery-slope 
argument put forward by those opposed to greater energy drink regulation). 
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health effects, energy drinks, like tobacco, may be on the path to 
increased FDA regulation.152 
B. A Caffeine Conundrum—The Link to Tobacco and the Need for Regulation 
In order to determine the necessity of energy drink regulation, one 
should take a step back and examine the drink’s most potent ingredient, 
caffeine, one of the most widely used psychoactive drugs in the United 
States and the world.153  Similar to the nicotine found in tobacco, the 
physiological effects of caffeine vary from person to person; however, 
once in the bloodstream, caffeine stimulates the heart and central 
nervous system within thirty minutes to an hour.154  To that end, 
periodic as well as habitual consumers of caffeine typically ingest the 
drug to improve alertness, concentration, energy, focus, and even 
feelings of sociability.155 Interestingly, the most noticeable physiological 
                                                 
152 See infra Part III.B (comparing the negative health consequences of tobacco use to 
adverse therapeutic effects of energy drink consumption). 
153 Jaffe, supra note 91, at 683; see also Pickworth, supra note 91, at 1066 (stating that 
caffeine is “a psychoactive drug used by 80% of the population of the USA”) cited in 
Prothro, supra note 91, at 66.  Regarding the safety of caffeine ingestion, Gwendolyn 
Prothro states that caffeine consumed in reasonable amounts “is a remedy as a stimulant 
and a diuretic.  But in large doses, it is a poison, an addictive substance injurious to human 
health.  Moderation, therefore, should be the goal of consumers and the goal 
communicated by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).”  Prothro, supra note 91, at 66.  
Caffeine is an alkaloid, or nitrogen-containing substance, with the chemical formula 
C8H10N4O2.  Id.  It belongs to the family of chemicals known as methylxanthines, which also 
includes the closely related chemicals theophylline and theobromine.  Id.  According to 
Prothro, caffeine in its purest form is 
a white powder or a mass of glistening, white needles.  It occurs 
naturally in Cocoa, the Coffea arabica plant, the kola nut, and the 
leaves of Thea sinensis.  It can be created synthetically and by 
extraction from cocoa, coffee bean or tea leaf waste.  It is present in a 
wide variety of prepared food and drugs:  coffees, teas, soft drinks, 
chocolates, and various pain relievers; thus it is ingested daily by 
people across the world. 
Id. at 66–67 (footnotes omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
154 See Prothro, supra note 91, at 67 (explaining the definite effects of caffeine 
consumption on the heart, intestines, muscles, and central nervous system). 
155 Caffeine Myths and Facts, supra note 46.  In addition, users of caffeine claim: 
As a stimulant, it perks us up in the morning and generally restore[s] 
mental alertness or wakefulness during [states of] fatigue or 
drowsiness.  It may improve semantic memory, logical reasoning, 
recall and recognition memory, at least transiently.  As an analgesic 
adjuvant in aspirin and aspirin/acetaminophen combinations, it helps 
to reduce pain.  And as an ingredient in menstrual drug products, it is 
effective in combating the fatigue and water weight gain associated 
with menstrual and pre-menstrual periods. 
Prothro, supra note 91, at 68–69 (alterations in original) (footnotes omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
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effects of tobacco are strikingly similar to those of energy drinks.156  
These effects include “increased heart rate, increased release of 
adrenaline, and a direct stimulatory effect on the brain, which combine 
to produce the mild ‘rush’ cigarette smokers may experience when they 
light up.”157  Some scientists and psychologists consider caffeine, like 
nicotine, to be a poison that causes addiction and negative health effects 
on the body.158  Comparable to the adverse health consequences of 
tobacco use, studies conclude that chronic ingestion of caffeine can result 
in stress, hypertension, decreased bone density, kidney stones, diabetes, 
hypoglycemia, and obesity.159  Equally detrimental, caffeine 
consumption may adversely affect pregnancy, and according to at least 
one study, may nearly double the risk for miscarriage.160  The most 
                                                 
156 See supra note 46 (detailing the pharmacological effects of energy drink consumption); 
supra note 81 (discussing the consequences of tobacco use). 
157 EDLIN & GOLANTY, supra note 81, at 394. 
158 See Prothro, supra note 91, at 72–73 (claiming that caffeine use is perhaps “[p]oison by 
[a]ddiction”).  According to an FDA ruling, caffeine consumption can lead to addiction, or 
as the FDA defines it, a “habituation.”  Drug Products for Over-the-Counter Human Use, 
53 Fed. Reg. 6100, 6103 (Feb. 29, 1988) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 340). 
159 SCHULTZ, supra note 92.  A study by researchers at Duke University concluded that 
there is a direct correlation between caffeine consumption and increased levels of stress in 
the body.  Id at 5.  More specifically, James D. Lane, Ph.D., an associate research professor 
at Duke and lead author of the study, stated that 
[t]he effects of coffee drinking are long-lasting and exaggerate the 
stress response both in terms of the body’s physiological response in 
blood pressure elevations and stress hormone levels, but it also 
magnifies a person’s perception of stress . . . .  People haven’t really 
accepted the fact that there could be a health downside to caffeine 
consumption, but our evidence—and that of other studies—shows that 
this downside exists and people should be aware of it in order to make 
the best possible health choices. 
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  With regard to bone density, research has shown 
there is an association between ingestion of caffeine and general skeletal weakness and 
osteoporosis.  Id. at 6.  In a study lead by Prema B. Rapuri, published in the American 
Journal of Clinical Nutrition, the researchers found that a higher rate of bone loss occurred 
at the spine in postmenopausal women (ages 65–77) with caffeine intake greater than three 
hundred milligrams per day.  Rapuri, supra note 92, at 699.  Another report published in 
the Journal of Urology concluded that caffeine consumption increases the levels of calcium, 
sodium, magnesium, and citrate—all of which increase the risk of developing kidney 
stones.  See Watch Your Caffeine Intake if You Are Prone to Kidney Stones, supra note 92.  
Pertaining to diabetes, caffeine raises both the glucose and insulin levels of those affected 
by type two diabetes.  See SCHULTZ, supra note 92, at 12 (explaining that continuous caffeine 
consumption can cause adult onset diabetes due to increased weight gain).  In addition, a 
Duke University medical study deduced that caffeine consumption by people with 
established type two diabetes experienced a significant increase of glucose levels following 
ingestion of the caffeine.  Lane, supra note 92. 
160 Grady, supra note 92.  This study, published in The American Journal of Obstetrics 
and Gynecology, found “that pregnant women who consume 200 milligrams or more of 
caffeine a day—the amount in 10 ounces of coffee or 25 ounces of tea—may double their 
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common effect of habitual caffeine consumption, however, is physical 
and psychological dependence evidenced by a user’s tolerance and 
withdrawal.161  For instance, studies in adult twins reveal that “caffeine 
toxicity and caffeine dependence are significantly and positively 
associated with various psychiatric disorders including major 
depression, generalized anxiety disorder, panic disorder, antisocial 
personality disorder, alcohol dependence, and cannabis and cocaine 
abuse/dependence.”162  Collectively, these scientific results reinforce the 
pro-regulation arguments which provide that because energy drink 
consumption affirmatively causes many of the same negative 
physiological and pharmacological effects as nicotine, such beverages 
should be regulated in a fashion similar to the regulation of tobacco.163 
In contrast, those who reject the argument that drugs with similar 
physiological and pharmacological effects should be regulated similarly 
generally emphasize that although the results of caffeine ingestion are 
transitory, its stimulatory and diuretic properties can benefit your 
                                                                                                             
risk of miscarriage.  Pregnant women should try to give up caffeine for at least the first 
three or four months,” according to the lead author of the study, Dr. De-Kun Li, a 
reproductive and perinatal epidemiologist at the Kaiser Permanente Division of Research 
in Oakland, California.  Id. 
161 Prothro, supra note 91, at 72–73 (“[C]affeine exhibits the features of a typical 
psychoactive substance of dependence.”) (quoting Eric C. Strain et al., Caffeine Dependence 
Syndrome:  Evidence from Case Histories and Experimental Evaluations, 272 J.A.M.A. 1043 
(1994)).  Dependence, the most common effect of continual ingestion of caffeine, manifests 
itself through at least three of these four symptoms:  tolerance, withdrawal, persistent 
desire, or unsuccessful attempts to reduce consumption.  Id.  “The [Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders] defines substance dependence using a generic set 
of cognitive, physiological, and behavioral symptoms, including the inability to quit, use 
despite harm, using more than intended, withdrawal, and tolerance.”  Reissig, supra note 
52, at 5.  Interestingly, the DSM-IV-TR does not categorize caffeine as a substance that can 
cause dependence; in fact, it “specifically excludes” it from its diagnostic schema.  Id.  The 
World Health Organization, on the other hand, considers caffeine as a substance that can 
cause dependence.  Id.  Most experts agree that withdrawal is the most common symptom 
related to caffeine reliance.  See Prothro, supra note 91, at 73 (footnote omitted) 
(“Withdrawal . . . can occur after ceasing the consumption of as little as two cups of coffee a 
day (roughly 250 milligrams), within eighteen to twenty-four hours after the last caffeine 
intake.”).  According to a medical review led by Chad J. Reissig, “[i]n addition to headache, 
other caffeine withdrawal symptoms include tiredness/fatigue, sleepiness/drowsiness, 
dysphoric mood (e.g., miserable, decreased well-being/contentedness), difficulty 
concentrating/decreased cognitive performance, depression, irritability, nausea/vomiting, 
and muscle aches/stiffness.”  Reissig, supra note 52, at 5. 
162 Reissig, supra note 52, at 6.  Relating to the relationship of cigarettes and caffeine, 
Reissig writes that “human and animal studies show that caffeine increases the reinforcing 
effects of nicotine.  Epidemiology studies show that cigarette smokers consume more 
caffeine than nonsmokers, an effect that may be partially due to increased caffeine 
metabolism among cigarette smokers.”  Id. (citations omitted). 
163 See id. (discussing the relationship of caffeine to dependence on tobacco). 
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health.164  Further, opponents to regulation argue that caffeine stimulates 
brain function and may even enhance athletic performance.165  Critics of 
the purported caffeine and nicotine comparison might also argue that 
even if many of the physiological effects are the same, energy drinks 
should not be regulated like tobacco because, frankly, caffeine is far less 
lethal.166  Further, those critics might assert that the majority of tobacco 
studies conclude that the “death rate from cancer, heart disease, and 
respiratory diseases [are] higher among cigarette smokers than among 
nonsmokers,” and the same cannot be said for consumers and non-
consumers of energy drinks.167 
Both sides of the energy drink regulation debate form persuasive 
arguments and rely on credible scientific evidence, but the public health 
concern remains.168  Although caffeine dependence does not present as 
grave a problem as alcohol and nicotine addiction and does not cause 
nearly as many deaths, caffeine dependence is not trivial—caffeine is one 
of the most widely used drugs in the United States, and it causes 
numerous harmful health consequences each year.169  Scientific 
investigation establishes that alcohol, tobacco, and caffeine interconnect, 
                                                 
164 See Prothro, supra note 91, at 68 (explaining why there is a caffeine conundrum). 
165 See CLARK, supra note 95, at 178–79 (explaining the effects of caffeine with regard to 
exercise).  “The vast majority of the studies conclude that caffeine does indeed enhance 
performance (by about 11 percent) and makes the effort seem easier (by about 6 percent).  
Endurance athletes notice more benefits than those who do shorter bouts of exercise.”  Id. 
(citation omitted). 
166 See supra note 46 (detailing the therapeutic effects of energy drink consumption); 
RABINOFF, supra note 5, at 11 (discussing the lethalness of tobacco and its effect on 
Americans).  Sadly, “[e]very single day, more than a thousand Americans—in excess of 8,000 
a week or more than 35,000 a month—are killed by the effects of smoking.  Its cost in 
dollars and human lives staggers the imagination.”  Id. at 11. 
167 EDLIN & GOLANTY, supra note 81, at 396.  Edlin and Golanty state that “smoking 
decreases a person’s life expectancy by an average of seven years.  Smokers between the 
ages of 35 and 70 have death rates three times higher than those who have never smoked.”  
Id. 
168 See infra Part IV (proposing amendments to the FDCA with the aim of protecting the 
public health and safety from harmful effects of energy drinks). 
169 Prothro, supra note 91, at 73–74.  Restating conclusions of multiple studies regarding 
the relationship of caffeine to dependence on other substances, Chad Reissig articulates the 
following: 
[a] study examining the co-occurrence of substance use among drug 
abusers concluded that dependence on caffeine, nicotine and alcohol 
were governed by the same factors. . . . More specifically, with regard 
to cigarette smoking, human and animal studies show that caffeine 
increases the reinforcing effects of nicotine.  Epidemiology studies 
show that cigarette smokers consume more caffeine than nonsmokers, 
an effect that may be partially due to increased caffeine metabolism 
among cigarette smokers. 
Reissig, supra note 52, at 10 (citations omitted). 
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and this correlation fuels the dispute regarding more extensive 
regulation of caffeine.170  But, before any form of increased regulation is 
promulgated, the FDA must first determine whether it possesses 
jurisdiction to direct a new legislative policy.171 
C. The FDA’s Newly Acquired Jurisdiction of Tobacco—Is It Operative for 
Energy Drinks? 
Now that the FSPTCA has officially been enacted, the FDA possesses 
broad authority to regulate the manufacturing, marketing, and 
distribution of tobacco products.172  The DSHEA, in contrast, is an 
ambiguous and skeletal statute that may actually encourage 
manufacturers to characterize their product as a dietary supplement in 
order to circumvent regulatory red tape.173  Because the DSHEA does not 
expressly provide the FDA with the power to regulate heavily 
caffeinated beverages, some suggest the FDA could interpret the scope of 
the statute more broadly as it did with tobacco in the past.174  Such a 
course of action, however, could prove unsuccessful; perhaps the best 
solution for Congress is either to amend the FDCA or to pass a new 
statute expressly affording the FDA regulatory power over energy 
drinks similar to the power it now exercises over tobacco.175 
To ascertain whether the FDA has jurisdiction to regulate energy 
drinks in both pre- and post-market divisions, a comparison to the 
                                                 
170 See generally Reissig, supra note 52, at 10 (describing the association between caffeine, 
alcohol, and tobacco usage).  Some scientists and psychologists claim that caffeine acts as a 
gateway to other types of drug dependence and causes reckless behavior.  Id.  “In one 
study published by the American College of Health in March, [2008], students who drank 
at least six energy drinks per month were three times as likely to have smoked cigarettes, 
abused prescription drugs and been involved in fights.”  Warlick, supra note 94, at 2E.  
Further, researchers from Wake Forest University School of Medicine found that 
[s]tudents who consumed alcohol mixed with energy drinks were 
twice as likely to be hurt or injured, twice as likely to require medical 
attention, and twice as likely to ride with an intoxicated driver, as were 
students who did not consume alcohol mixed with energy drinks.  
Students who drank alcohol mixed with energy drinks were more than 
twice as likely to take advantage of someone else sexually, and almost 
twice as likely to be taken advantage of sexually. 
Public Health; Study Shows Energy Drink “Cocktails” Lead to Increased Injury Risk, supra note 
94, at 74. 
171 See infra Part III.C (applying principles of tobacco regulation to dietary supplements). 
172 See supra note 69 (discussing the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act 
and the FDA’s authority promulgated by the statute). 
173 See Onel, supra note 56, at 341 (providing an overview of the DSHEA). 
174 Cf. id. at 348 (stating that companies exploit the legal ambiguities of the DSHEA to 
gain a stronghold in the market). 
175 See infra Part IV (proposing a modified version of the DSHEA that will provide the 
FDA with authority to regulate dietary supplements on a level similar to tobacco). 
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FDA’s attempt to regulate tobacco pre-FSPTCA is instructive.176  For 
example, “[a]lmost invariably, when courts (and academics) grapple 
with whether an agency’s views on the extent of its own powers should 
merit Chevron deference, they refer to such issues, without 
differentiation, as ‘jurisdictional.’”177  Essentially, there are three 
situations pertaining to an agency’s jurisdictional interpretation:  
expansion or contraction of agency authority; fabrication or 
transformation of power; and alteration of regulatory scope.178  A 
noteworthy case involving the FDA’s scope of authority is FDA v. Brown 
& Williamson Tobacco Corp., in which the Court held that Congress did 
not intend to allow the FDA to regulate tobacco under the FDCA.179  
Congress effectively superseded the Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. 
decision by passing the FSPTCA, which ultimately could open the door 
for the FDA to extend the FDCA’s statutory scope and regulate other 
addictive products such as energy drinks.180 
D. Is the FDA Re-emerging from the Depths of Congressional Neglect? 
Critics of more expansive FDA regulatory authority commonly claim 
that the FDA is overburdened, underfunded, and understaffed.181  This 
                                                 
176 Cf. Sales & Adler, supra note 67, at 1513–15 (providing case law that challenged the 
FDA’s scope of authority under the FDCA). 
177 Id. at 1502.  Justice Stevens, writing for the majority in the landmark decision of 
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., articulated the following: 
When a court reviews an agency’s construction of the statute which it 
administers, it is confronted with two questions.  First, always, is the 
question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question 
at issue.  If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; 
for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the 
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.  If, however, the court 
determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at 
issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the 
statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative 
interpretation.  Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with 
respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the 
agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute. 
467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984) (footnotes omitted). 
178 See Sales & Adler, supra note 67, at 1503–06 (providing a categorization of agency 
jurisdictional interpretation). 
179 529 U.S. 120, 126 (2000).  In her majority opinion, Justice O’Connor stated that 
“although agencies are generally entitled to deference in the interpretation of statutes that 
they administer, a reviewing ‘court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the 
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.’”  Id. at 125–26 (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 
842–43) (footnote omitted). 
180 Conway, supra note 67. 
181 See Abdullah, supra note 77 (providing statements from various senators who believe 
the FDA lacks the resources to direct and enforce the FSPTCA). 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 45, No. 2 [2011], Art. 7
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol45/iss2/7
2011] Regulating Energy Drinks 731 
repetitious criticism was evident during floor debates concerning the 
FSPTCA and the questioning that followed.182  Most notably, Senator 
Saxby Chambliss of Georgia made the following assertion: 
I voted against the FDA tobacco bill because I’m 
opposed to the overregulation of an industry that’s 
already highly regulated, from farmer to 
manufacturer . . . .  The bill saddles the already 
overburdened FDA with even more oversight duties, 
and does nothing to reduce the rate of smoking among 
Americans—cigarettes already on the shelves will 
remain on the market.183 
                                                 
182 Id.  Abdullah writes that Minority Leader Mitch McConnell of Kentucky, Senator 
Richard Burr of North Carolina, Senator Saxby Chambliss of Georgia, and Senator Jim 
Bunning of Kentucky “[a]ll oppose giving additional tobacco regulatory powers to the 
FDA, an agency they argue doesn’t have adequate resources for the task.”  Id.  Senator 
McConnell argues that “[m]andating the FDA to regulate and approve the use of tobacco 
would be a distortion of the agency’s mission and a tremendous misuse of its overstretched 
priorities . . . .  We should focus FDA resources on protecting the public health, not 
burdening it with an impossible assignment.”  Id.  In his opening remarks of the floor 
debate, Representative Henry Waxman articulated that 
[s]ome have objected that this bill is too big a challenge for an already 
overburdened FDA.  But it is clear to me that FDA’s recent struggles 
are primarily a result of years of chronic underfunding. . . . [W]hen we 
give the agency this new responsibility, we also must give it the 
resources necessary to do the job and to do it well. 
155 CONG. REC. H4338–39 (Apr. 1, 2009) (statement of Rep. Waxman). 
183 Abdullah, supra note 77.  Some speculate that the senators from Kentucky, North 
Carolina, and Georgia voted against the FSPTCA to protect the Big Tobacco companies 
located in their respective states.  See id. (“[Those senators] say cigarette companies’ 
campaign contributions didn’t color their positions on the legislation.”).  Concerning 
campaign contributions, it is interesting to note: 
Over the course of his nearly quarter-century Senate career, Minority 
Leader Mitch McConnell, who hails from the tobacco-rich state of 
Kentucky, has received $419,025 from the tobacco industry, more than 
any other member of Congress, according to the Center for Responsive 
Politics, a nonprofit, nonpartisan organization that analyzes the 
influence of money on politics and policy.  North Carolina Republican 
Sen. Richard Burr, who led the opposition to the bill, is the second 
highest recipient and netted $359,100 from tobacco-related political 
action committees and individual contributions.  His state is the 
nation’s largest tobacco grower and is home to R.J. Reynolds, the 
nation’s second largest tobacco manufacturing company, which 
contributed $196,850 to Burr’s campaigns.  Georgia Sen. Saxby 
Chambliss, the ranking Republican on the Senate Agriculture 
Committee, is the third highest recipient with $228,700.  Kentucky Sen. 
Jim Bunning, who’s up for re-election next year and is considered the 
most vulnerable Senate Republican, ranks eighth with $194,166. 
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Conversely, a user fee funds the FSPTCA, which will generate $4.5 
billion over nine years by requiring tobacco companies to directly 
transfer a percentage of revenue to the FDA.184  Because of this user fee, 
lack of funding is likely not a problem for the FDA to effectively 
regulate; therefore, the argument that the FDA is overburdened and 
understaffed may be more persuasive.185 
As evidence to support the notion that the FDA may be 
understaffed, it currently employs only 11,000 scientific, technical, and 
professional staff to carry out its mission of protecting the health and 
safety of more than 300 million Americans.186  Over the years, Congress 
has simultaneously expanded the size and power of the FDA, while 
encumbering it with an increasingly broad and arduous task.187  Peter 
                                                                                                             
Id. (citing statistics from the Center for Responsive Politics). 
184 See 155 CONG. REC. H4339 (Apr. 1, 2009) (statement of Rep. Waxman) (“The tobacco 
program will be fully funded through a new user fee paid for by the industry.”).  User fee 
taxes are also referred to as “sin taxes,” which are taxes of immediate-gratification goods.  
See Rizzo & Whitman, supra note 51, at 734 (providing examples of sin taxes).  According to 
the FDA, “[t]he User Fee program allows FDA to fulfill its mission of protecting the public 
health and accelerating innovation in the industry. . . . The Division of User Fees is 
responsible for the overall management of the program . . . and [it] maintains an accounts 
receivable system used for user fee invoicing and collections.”  FDA, USER FEES, supra note 
79.  More specifically, “[t]he Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act User Fee 
program will generate over $4.5 [billion] in user fees over nine years (2009–2018).”  FDA, 
TOBACCO PRODUCT FEES, supra note 79. 
185 See FDA, FISCAL YEAR 2010 CONGRESSIONAL JUSTIFICATION, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:  
INTRODUCTION AND MISSION, supra note 78, at 2 (providing an overview of the 2010 
proposed budget for the FDA).  The Commissioner of the FDA, Margaret A. Hamburg, 
summarizes the 2010 budget changes as follows: 
The fiscal year (FY) 2010 President’s Budget request for FDA is 
$3,178,369,000.  This represents a total program level increase of 
$510,554,000 above the amount enacted into law for FY 2009.  The total 
program level request includes new budget authority, current law user 
fees, and new proposed user fees.  The FY 2010 increase for user fees is 
$215,359,000, including $141,000,000 in proposed new user fees.  The 
FY 2010 increase in budget authority is $295,195,000, of which 
$29,536,000 is for the cost of living pay increase. 
Id. 
186 Id.  The Executive Summary further states that the “FDA affects the lives of every 
American every day.  Each year, consumers spend nearly $1.5 trillion on FDA-regulated 
products.  This represents twenty percent of all consumer expenditures.”  Id. 
187 Id.  Succinctly, the FDA responsible for 
protecting the public health by assuring the safety of America’s foods, 
the safety, efficacy, and security of human and veterinary drugs, 
biological products and medical devices, and the safety and security of 
cosmetics and products that emit radiation.  FDA is also responsible 
for advancing the public health by helping to speed innovations that 
make medicines safer and more effective.  FDA also provides the 
public with accurate, science-based information about medicines and 
foods to improve their health. 
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Barton Hutt, former FDA chief counsel, contends that this situation is a 
“paradigmatic example of the ‘hollow government’ syndrome—an 
agency with expanded responsibilities, stagnant resources, and the 
consequent inability to implement or enforce its statutory mandates.”188  
This syndrome drives the bureaucratic, anti-regulatory contention that 
the FDA is not capable of effectively regulating yet another large 
industry—the energy drink industry.189 
A branch of the FDA, the Center for Food Safety and Applied 
Nutrition (“CFSAN”) headquartered in College Park, Maryland, 
currently regulates energy drinks as dietary supplements.190  In the past, 
Congress has expected the CFSAN to implement multiple complex 
statutes while receiving less funding each fiscal year and a reduced 
                                                                                                             
Id.  See generally Hutt, The State of Science, supra note 45, at 434–36 (providing a history of the 
FDA and the products it regulates). 
188 Hutt, The State of Science, supra note 45, at 432.  Hutt further discusses the troubles the 
FDA is facing by stating the following: 
In terms of both personnel and the money to support them, the agency 
is barely hanging on by its fingertips.  The accumulating unfunded 
statutory responsibilities imposed on the FDA, the extraordinary 
advance of scientific discoveries, the complexity of the new products 
and claims submitted to the FDA for premarket review and approval, 
the emergence of challenging safety problems, and the globalization of 
the industries that the FDA regulates—coupled with chronic 
underfunding by Congress—have conspired to place demands upon 
the scientific base of the agency that far exceed its capacity to respond. 
Id. 
189 Cf. 155 CONG. REC. H4341 (Apr. 1, 2009) (statement of Rep. Buyer) (claiming that the 
FDA does not have the resources necessary to more comprehensively regulate the tobacco 
industry).  In a floor debate regarding the FSPTCA, Representative Steve Buyer of Indiana 
stated that 
Congress has spent a great deal of time investigating the ways in 
which the FDA has been unable to fulfill its core mission.  Burdening 
the FDA with additional responsibilities outside the agency’s expertise 
and core missions at this time will have dire consequences for the 
American people and the FDA’s ability to ensure the safety and 
efficacy of our Nation’s food, drugs and medical devices. . . . At a time 
when FDA is struggling to perform many of its core functions, 
diversion of its limited resources will negatively impact the safety of 
the American public. 
Id. 
190 See Hutt, The State of Science, supra note 45, at 459–60 (discussing the disintegrating 
state of the CFSAN due to insufficient funding and personnel).  On its website, the FDA 
emphasizes that “[t]he Center has over 800 employees, who range from secretaries and 
other support staff to highly specialized professionals—such as chemists, microbiologists, 
toxicologists, food technologists, pathologists, molecular biologists, pharmacologists, 
nutritionists, epidemiologists, mathematicians, sanitarians, physicians and veterinarians.”  
About the Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition, supra note 43.  The CFSAN ensures 
that the “nation’s food supply is safe, sanitary, wholesome, and honestly labeled, and that 
cosmetic products are safe and properly labeled.”  CFSAN—What We Do, supra note 43. 
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allotment of full-time equivalent employees.191  More recently however, 
in the fiscal years of 2008 and 2009, the CFSAN employed 753 and 854 
workers, respectively.192  To help address this understaffing issue, 
Congress is planning to increase the employment allotment for the 
CFSAN to an estimated 947 skilled positions in the fiscal year 2010.193  In 
the 2008 and 2009 CFSAN budget for salaries and expenses, Congress 
authorized $576,659,000 and $648,722,000, respectively.194  For fiscal year 
2010, the FDA requested $782,915,000, which also tends to indicate that 
the CFSAN is gaining strength.195  Consequently, it appears that the 
FDA, and more specifically, the CFSAN, is on the rebound pertaining to 
funding and employment figures.196  Although critics of increased FDA 
regulatory power contend the FDA is already overburdened, 
underfunded, and understaffed, in actuality, the FDA seems to be 
reemerging from the depths of congressional neglect and setting sail on 
the proper course to protect and promote healthy lifestyles.197 
Although there is fervent disagreement regarding the therapeutic 
effects of caffeine, the necessity of regulation, and the amount of FDA 
resources, it is not necessarily a negative atmosphere.198  Rather, as 
                                                 
191 See Hutt, The State of Science, supra note 45, at 459–61 (detailing concerns regarding the 
viability of the food safety program in the CFSAN).  According to Hutt, “[i]n the fifteen 
years from 1992 to 2007, CFSAN suffered a reduction in force of 138 people, from 950 to 
812, or fifteen percent of its staff.”  Id. at 459.  Although the CFSAN suffered enormous 
losses in funding and personnel, Congress 
expected [the CFSAN] to implement such complex statutes as the 
Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990, the Dietary Supplement 
Health and Education Act of 1994, the FDA Modernization Act of 1997, 
the Food Safety and Security Amendments of 2002, the Food Allergen 
Labeling and Consumer Protection Act of 2004, and the Sanitary Food 
Transportation Act of 2005, and most recently the Dietary Supplement 
Adverse Event Reporting Act of 2006 and the Food Safety 
Amendments of 2007—to name just the most important unfunded 
food statutes enacted during this period—while facing a loss of 138 
people. 
Id. 
192 FOOD & DRUG ADMINISTRATION, DETAIL OF FULL-TIME EQUIVALENT (FTE) 
EMPLOYMENT PROGRAM LEVEL, supra note 43, at 265. 
193 Id. 
194 FOOD & DRUG ADMINISTRATION, FY 2010 ALL PURPOSE TABLE—BUDGET AUTHORITY, 
supra note 43. 
195 Id. 
196 See supra notes 194–95 and accompanying text (providing the fiscal budgets for 2008, 
2009, and estimated budget for 2010). 
197 See infra Part IV (proposing a plan to increase FDA funding and personnel so the 
agency may more effectively regulate the energy drink industry). 
198 See supra Part III.A (providing a comparison of the various forms of regulation); supra 
Part III.B (comparing the therapeutic effects of caffeine to tobacco); supra Part III.D 
(analyzing the scarcity of resources argument regarding the FDA’s ability to regulate). 
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Mahatma Gandhi wisely articulated, “[h]onest disagreement is often a 
good sign of progress.”199  Progress in energy drink regulation could 
come by means of a congressional act to amend the FDCA that increases 
funding and employee allotment for the CFSAN, as well as modifies the 
language of the FDCA to permit increased regulation of dietary 
supplements and an implementation of an energy drink user fee 
program to raise capital.200 
IV.  PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO THE FDCA 
A practical and efficient solution to the energy drink regulation 
conundrum is for Congress to pass legislation amending the FDCA and 
expressly afford the FDA regulatory power over energy drinks similar to 
that which it now exercises over tobacco.  If Congress amends the FDCA 
allowing the FDA to implement certain protective measures, the FDA 
will effectively avoid jurisdictional obstacles.201  The FSPTCA resolved 
ambiguity regarding tobacco regulation, and an amendment of the 
FDCA can do the same.202  The following subsections provide a proposed 
statutory definition, a FSPTCA provision applicable to energy drink 
regulation, suggested directives for implementation, and recommended 
warning label requirements for energy drinks.203 
A. Proposed Statutory Definition of an Energy Drink 
Congress should amend the FDCA (21 U.S.C. § 321) by inserting a 
provision following section 321(ff)(2) that explicitly defines an energy 
drink as “a heavily-caffeinated liquid substance for use by man to supplement 
the diet.”204  This provision will remove ambiguity as to whether an 
energy drink is classified as a conventional food product or a dietary 
supplement.205  Proposed subsection (ss), following section 321(rr), will 
                                                 
199 JOHNSON, supra note 108, at 117. 
200 See infra Part IV (proposing a modification of the FDCA that would afford the FDA the 
requisite authority and capital to regulate energy drinks). 
201 See supra Part III.C (explaining FDA jurisdictional issues). 
202 The following proposals are the author’s contributions.  Specifically, proposed 
additions are italicized, and existing statutory language is left unchanged.  The author’s 
commentary and suggestion for implementation follows each proposed FDCA 
amendment. 
203 See infra Part IV (providing amendments to the FDCA and directives for FDA 
regulation of energy drinks). 
204 See 21 U.S.C. § 321(ff) (2006) (defining dietary supplement). 
205 See supra text accompanying notes 54–61 (explaining the statutory overlap regarding 
dietary supplement and conventional food products). 
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define the phrase “heavily caffeinated liquid substance.”206  Proposed 
subsection (ss) provides the following: 
(ss) The term “heavily caffeinated liquid substance” means 
any fluid liquid beverage containing: 
 (1) a quantity of caffeine in excess of eighty (80) 
milligrams per eight (8) ounces; or 
 (2) one or more of the following ingredients constituting 
an “energy blend”: 
(A) Carnitine; 
(B) Glucuronolactone; 
(C) Glucose; 
(D) Guarana; 
(E) Inositol; 
(F) Maltodextrin; 
(G) Panax Ginseng; 
(H) Super Citramax (Hydroxy Citric Acid, Garcinia 
Cambogia Extract); 
(I)  Taurine; or, 
(J) Yohimbine HCL. 
Eighty milligrams caffeine per eight ounces is generally the 
minimum threshold amount of caffeine that energy drink manufacturers 
include in their beverages.207  In addition, energy drinks contain “energy 
blends” commonly concocted of the above-listed ingredients.208  Thus, 
this proposed subsection categorizes a heavily caffeinated beverage as an 
energy drink according to its ingredients, rather than the manufacturer’s 
marketing claims.209 
B. Application of FSPTCA Provisions to Energy Drink Regulation 
Next, Congress should amend the FDCA and afford the FDA the 
authority to regulate heavily caffeinated beverages in a way similar to 
how it regulates tobacco.  In the first line of the FSPTCA regarding the 
purpose of the statute, Congress unequivocally granted the FDA power 
to regulate the manufacturing, marketing, and distribution of tobacco 
                                                 
206 See supra note 46 (listing common energy drink ingredients and discussing the 
advertised and actual pharmacological effects of each ingredient). 
207 See supra note 47 and accompanying text (discussing typical caffeine content of energy 
drinks). 
208 See supra note 46 (listing common energy drink ingredients contained in “energy 
blends”). 
209 See supra notes 54–61 (explaining why the DSHEA permits manufacturers to 
categorize its product as a dietary supplement solely based on marketing claims). 
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products—a power that can be operative in regulating energy drinks as 
well.210  In section 342(f)(1) of the FDCA, Congress should include a new 
subsection (E), which grants the FDA the requisite authority to regulate 
energy drinks.211  The proposed amendment to section 342(f)(1) is as 
follows: 
(f) Dietary supplement or ingredient:  safety. 
(1) If it is a dietary supplement or contains a dietary 
ingredient that— 
 . . . . 
 (E) presents a genuine risk of illness or injury 
proximately resulting from ingestion of a heavily 
caffeinated liquid substance (as defined by 21 U.S.C. 
§ 321(ss)), the Secretary shall have discretion to regulate 
the manufacturing, marketing, and distribution in the 
least restrictive manner appropriate to protect the public 
health. 
To begin, proposed subsection (E) provides that the FDA will retain 
the initial burden of proof.  In order to regulate an energy drink, the FDA 
(or more specifically, the CFSAN) must prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence that one or more of the ingredients in the energy drink presents 
a “genuine risk of illness or injury.”212  This standard is not as onerous as 
the “significant or unreasonable risk of illness or injury” standard stated 
in subsection (A), but it still requires the FDA to show that one or more 
of the ingredients contained in a given energy drink should be regulated 
to protect the public health.213  This requirement benefits manufacturers 
because the FDA cannot issue blanket regulations for the entire industry.  
Instead, the FDA must evaluate the ingredients of each individual 
product with regard to safety.  More specifically, the CFSAN must show, 
                                                 
210 See supra Part III.C (providing an analysis whether certain provisions of the FSPTCA 
are applicable to energy drink regulation).  See generally supra Part II.C (discussing the 
Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of 2009).  In addition to amending 
the FDCA, Congress should pass a directive, which implements an energy drink user-fee 
program to help fund the FDA’s regulatory efforts. 
211 See 21 U.S.C. § 342(f)(1) (2006) (defining safety requirements for dietary supplements). 
212 See e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).  Black’s Law Dictionary defines 
“genuine” as “(Of a thing) authentic or real; having the quality of what a given thing 
purports to be or to have.”  Id.  Comparatively speaking, the “genuine risk” standard is less 
burdensome to prove than the “significant or unreasonable risk” standard stated in 
subsection (A) but is a greater standard to surpass than, for instance, a legitimate or 
justifiable risk. 
213 Id. 
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through empirical evidence, that one or more of the ingredients included 
in the energy drink yields a genuine risk of illness or injury.214 
Next, the second clause of proposed subsection (E) grants the 
Secretary of the FDA authority to regulate the manufacturing, 
marketing, and distribution of energy drinks as he or she deems 
necessary.  This authority is constrained, however, by the third clause 
that allows the Secretary to implement regulations as needed to protect 
the public health, but only in a minimally intrusive manner.  The third 
clause will help prevent an FDA Secretary from exceeding his or her 
grant of authority, thus hopefully averting a potential Chevron-type 
conflict.215 
C. Suggested Directives for Implementation and Enforcement 
Proposed subsection (E) provides the FDA with the power to 
regulate the manufacturing, marketing, and distribution of energy 
drinks; however, what does that entail?216  Although listed first in the 
proposed statute, the Secretary may only use the authority to regulate 
manufacturing as a last resort where an impending, perilous risk to the 
public is present.  If the situation requires, the Secretary may compel the 
manufacturer to remove the energy drink from the market and modify 
its ingredients.  Once the manufacturer makes the required changes, it 
must file for re-approval. 
When the CFSAN determines that a certain energy drink poses a 
genuine risk of illness or injury to the populace, the Secretary should 
initially focus his or her efforts on issues associated with energy drink 
marketing.  For example, a straightforward and effective regulatory 
strategy would require conspicuous warning labels on the cans, 
packaging, and advertisements.217  For years, the FDA required tobacco 
companies to print, in rotation, various Surgeon General Warnings to 
inform tobacco users of the risks involved with tobacco use.218  The FDA 
should implement a similar requirement for energy drinks because it is 
simple to institute and does not increase manufacturing costs. 
                                                 
214 Id. 
215 See generally supra note 177 (discussing the Chevron analysis courts apply when faced 
with a question whether a governmental agency exceeded its grant of authority). 
216 The subsequent implementation suggestions and guidelines are of the author’s 
opinion. 
217 See supra note 74 and accompanying text.  According to the FSPTCA, tobacco 
manufacturers will be required as of June 22, 2011, to print text and graphic warning labels 
covering fifty percent of the front and rear panels of the package.  See Effective Dates of New 
FDA Tobacco Law Provisions, supra note 74 (discussing FSPTCA implementation guidelines). 
218 See supra note 73 (listing common Surgeon General’s Warnings displayed on tobacco 
packaging). 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 45, No. 2 [2011], Art. 7
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol45/iss2/7
2011] Regulating Energy Drinks 739 
D. Recommended Warning Label Requirements 
Similar to tobacco labeling standards, the FDA should require 
energy drink manufacturers to display, in a contrasting color, various 
bold-font warnings determined by the FDA.219  Further, the FDA should 
require manufacturers to display the warning above the brand label and 
rotate the warning statements on a quarterly basis.  For instance, the 
warnings could state the caffeine content in milligrams and give a 
proportional comparison to a standard unit, such as a single cup of 
coffee (e.g., “This beverage contains the equivalent amount of caffeine in 2.5 
cups of coffee.”).  In addition, cautionary statements should be displayed 
on a rotating basis stating the following: 
“Do not consume this beverage if you are pregnant or 
nursing, or less than 13 years of age”; 
“This beverage may cause nervousness, irritability, 
sleeplessness, and occasional rapid heartbeat”; 
“Do not consume this beverage if you experience chest pains”; 
and 
“This beverage may cause caffeine intoxication and lead to 
addiction.” 
Finally, proposed subsection (E), pursuant to CFSAN findings and 
the Secretary’s judgment, permits the FDA to regulate the distribution of 
energy drinks.  This power should not be employed for punitive 
measures but rather used for protective purposes.  For instance, the FDA 
could restrict the sale and supply of energy drinks in public elementary 
and middle schools.  Several schools nationwide already ban the sale and 
supply of energy drinks; thus, this restriction is merely an extension of 
locally enforced policy.  In closing, the former propositions serve as a 
plan to achieve a theoretical objective.  In order for this regulatory 
scheme to develop and flourish, Congress must amend the FDCA, 
thereby affording the FDA greater regulatory authority analogous to the 
recently enacted FSPTCA. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
As time passes and new generations are born, government policy 
evolves.  In the United States’ representative democracy, sometimes 
elected officials speak for the majority of their constituents and 
sometimes for themselves.  Further, the scope of government regulation 
                                                 
219 See supra note 74 (discussing the broad authority Congress granted the FDA by 
passing the FSPTCA). 
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is perpetually debated, and political majorities generally control the 
argument.  However, one tenet that elected officials typically share is the 
dedication to protect the public’s health and safety.   
Legislators commonly rely on scientific evidence when determining 
whether to regulate a product.  In the case of energy drinks, results of 
scientific studies conflict, but the safety concern remains.  Congress 
retains the power to amend the FDCA and insert provisions that enable 
the FDA to regulate heavily caffeinated beverages.  Regardless of the 
political party in power, Congress often responds too late after the harm 
occurs.  Perhaps preemptive regulation is imprudent, but it is worth an 
attempt.  Therefore, an amendment of the FDCA granting the FDA 
authority to regulate energy drinks would be a step in the right 
direction. 
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